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I. INTRODUCTION
In the mid-1970s, Paul Edmond Dowling and William Samuel 
Theaker ran an “extensive bootleg record operation.”1 The two men 
made unauthorized “phonorecords of unreleased [Elvis] Presley 
recordings. . . [using] material from a variety of sources, including 
studio outtakes, acetates, soundtracks from Presley motion pictures, and 
tapes of Presley concerts and television appearances.”2 Dowling was a 
huge Elvis Presley fan, so he “handled the ‘artistic’ end of the operation, 
contributing his knowledge of the Presley subculture, seeking out and 
selecting the musical material, designing the covers and labels, and 
writing the liner notes.”3 Theaker, who lived in Los Angeles, handled 
the logistics of the operation. He “had some familiarity with the music 
industry, took care of the business end, arranging for the record 
pressings, distributing catalogs, and filling orders.”4
In the pre-digital era, their bootlegging was difficult work that 
required access to expensive equipment and a distribution network. 
Dowling and Theaker’s operation required them to contract with a 
record-pressing company—first in Burbank, California, and later in Los 
1. Dowling v. U.S., 473 U.S. 207, 209 (1985). The Court defined a “bootleg phonograph” as 
“one which contains an unauthorized copy of a commercially available unreleased performance. . . . 
Though the terms frequently are used interchangeably, a ‘bootleg’ record is not the same as a 
‘pirated’ one, the latter being an unauthorized copy of a performance already commercially 
available.” Id. at 209, fn 2.   
2. Id. at 210. 
3. Id. at 210-11 (noting that Dowling was “an avid collector of Presley recordings.”). 
4. Id.
2
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Angeles and Miami, Florida.5  In addition to the operation being quite 
labor-intensive for the infringers, discovering infringers was equally 
difficult—more difficult than merely doing a Google search, finding 
infringing works on Youtube, or obtaining the Internet Service Provider6
addresses of people who have performed unauthorized downloads from 
Napster.7 For Theaker and Dowling, it was a large operation that still 
required a two-year FBI investigation to gather enough evidence to 
support an infringement action, and even then, the bootleggers were able 
to evade authorities for several years before they were caught.8
At the enactment of the 1976 Act, Dowling and Theaker’s business 
was typical of those pursued as infringers. The time and effort required 
to find a person who made an unauthorized single copy for personal use 
was not worth the effort. Dowling and Theaker’s mass-scale 
infringement, on the other hand, had a large, detrimental effect on the 
5. Id. (what defined these entrepreneurs’ operation as “bootlegging” was the fact that these
men “never obtained authorization from or paid royalties to the owners of the copyrights in the 
musical compositions.”)  
6.  Internet Service Provider, WIKIPEDIA, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/
Internet_service_provider (last visited April 29, 2017). When a person accesses the Internet through 
their ISP, their computer is given an identity—an “address” that identifies it to other computers also 
connected to the web.
7. Napster was a company that facilitated file sharing between individuals. It worked by
allowing “its users to: (1) make MP3 music files stored on individual computer hard drives available 
for copying by other Napster users; (2) search for MP3 music files stored on other users’ computers; 
and (3) transfer exact copies of the contents of other users’ MP3 files from one computer to another 
via the Internet.” A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d 1004, 1011 (9th Cir. 2003). In 
2003, the Ninth Circuit affirmed the U.S. District Court for the District of Northern California’s 
opinion that Napster was liable for secondary liability for the copyright infringement of its users and 
enjoined its operation. Id. at 1029. 
8. Dowling, 473 U.S at 211-12. According to the Court, “In early 1979, . . . having come to
suspect that the FBI was investigating the west coast operation, Theaker began making shipments 
by commercial trucking companies of large quantities of the albums to Dowling in Maryland.” Id. at 
211. 
Throughout 1979 and 1980, the venturers did their marketing through Send Service, a 
labeling and addressing entity, which distributed at least 50,000 copies of their catalog 
and advertising flyers to addresses on mailing lists provided by Theaker and Dowling. 
Theaker would collect customers’ orders from post office boxes in Glendale, Cal., and 
mail them to Dowling in Maryland, who would fill the orders. The two did a substantial 
business: the stipulated testimony establishes that throughout this period Dowling mailed 
several hundred packages per week and regularly spent $1,000 per week in postage. The 
men also had occasion to make large shipments from Los Angeles to Minor in Miami, 
who purchased quantities of their albums for resale through his own channels. 
Id. While Dowling, Theaker, and the other codefendants were found liable for nine counts of 
copyright infringement under 17 U.S.C. § 506(a), the Supreme Court reversed their criminal 
convictions for “eight counts of interstate transportation of stolen property, in violation of 18 U.S.C. 
§ 2314.” Id. at 210. The Court held that “phonorecords that include the performance of copyrighted
musical compositions for the use of which no authorization has been sought nor royalties paid” are 
not “stolen, converted or taken by fraud for the purposes of § 2314.” Id.
3
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sale of authorized copies of Elvis Presley’s music.9
With newer technologies, it is now possible to create high-quality 
copies in minutes rather than hours, and without any loss in the sound 
quality. Before 
the introduction of digital audio recording to the consumer electronics 
market in the 1980s . . . a person wishing to copy an original music re-
cording—e.g., wishing to make a cassette tape of a record or compact 
disc—was limited to analog, rather than digital, recording technology. 
With analog recording, each successive generation of copies suffers 
from an increasingly pronounced degradation in sound quality. . . . 
With digital recording by contrast, there is almost no degradation qual-
ity, no matter how many generations of copies are made. Digital copy-
ing thus allows thousands of perfect or near perfect copies to be made 
from a single original recording.10
These advances have led to two new targets for infringement 
actions. First, there is a new class of infringers—small-scale bootleggers 
(those who made unauthorized copies “of a commercially available 
unreleased performance”)11 and pirates (those who made unauthorized 
copies “of a performance already commercially available”).12 Second, 
individual infringers who make unauthorized copies for personal use—
and in the past did so with impunity and would not have been considered 
as objects to pursue—are more easily found because their activities now 
occur online, and are thus new targets for infringement actions. Both sets 
of infringers are also held to the same monetary damages that were 
originally meant for mass bootleggers and pirates.13 Technological 
advancements have also changed the ease with which one can sample 
music, print books, or add one’s own creativity to the expression of 
another. Software programs give us the ability to easily mash up songs14
and alter photographs to be in the style of everyone from M.C. Esher to 
9. According to the lawsuit, there were thousands of album sales by Dowling and Theaker
which resulted in lost revenue by the copyright owners of the Elvis songs. Dowling v. U.S., 739 
F.2d 1445, 1446-47 (9th Cir. 1984).
10. Recording Indus. Ass’n of Am. v. Diamond Multimedia Sys., Inc., 180 F.3d 1072, 1074-
75 (9th Cir. 1999). 
11. Dowling, 473 U.S. at 211. 
12. Id.
13. See discussion infra, Section V. 
14. A “mash-up” is a work that is created by combining parts from two or more sources, such 
as a musical composition created by digitally combining the instrumental and vocal tracks from 
different recordings, or combining a sound recording with an unrelated video. Mash-Up, MERRIAM-
WEBSTER ON-LINE DICTIONARY, http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/
mash%E2%80%93up (last visited May 1, 2017). 
4
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Van Goth to Degas and others.15 Many of these activities may not be 
infringing or would fall under traditional fair use16 or other defenses. 
There remains the assumption that an infringer is anyone who can 
be caught. Yet, as noted supra, when the Copyright Act of 197617 was 
enacted, those who could be caught were very different than who are 
caught today. We had very different concepts about who was the 
intended target of an infringement action than who fits into that mold 
now. The internet and cyberspace has allowed IP owners, with very little 
effort, to capture infringers who were not originally intended to be 
caught in their net. The ability of individuals to both easily infringe and 
easily be found infringing has altered the IP landscape in a significant 
way that affects IP’s fundamental values. 
Changes in who is now liable for infringement leads to the question 
of who should be considered an intended infringer and held liable, and 
whether all infringers should be treated equally with regards to damages. 
For example, should individual creativity and curiosity, without a 
commercial purpose, be protected from infringement action because it 
enhances our lives and our enjoyment of the creative works of others? 
Based on Congress’ policy considerations used when the acts were 
drafted, which only contemplated liability for mass infringers, it is 
imperative that we examine who should be the intended infringer, 
whether this definition needs adjustment, and whether all infringers 
should be treated the same with regards to remedies. Copyright law 
should advance and support the policies and philosophies behind 
copyright protection. If the law’s application no longer reflects those 
policies, then it harms both individuals and society. 
Technological advances have captured others as infringers in a net 
that was originally not supposed to hold them, and who are outside who 
was historically considered an intended infringer. If we are finding 
liability for people who should not be targets, how should this be 
resolved? If there should still be liability, should damages be at the same 
level as it is for the large-scale infringers originally envisioned by the 
drafters? We must question whether the consequences for infringement 
liability were intended to reach the individual infringer at such the harsh 
15. DeepArt.io is one such site. DEEPART.IO, https://deepart.io/ (last visited August 20,
2016). After uploading your picture onto their website, or downloading the iPhone App, one can 
render a photograph into any number of styles. Mindy Weisberger, Turn Your Photos Into Fine-Art 
‘Paintings’ on Free Website, LIVESCIENCE (April 14, 2016), http://www.livescience.com/54415-
computer-turns-photos-into-fine-art.html.  
16. 17 U.S.C. § 107. 
17. 17 U.S.C. §§ 101-810. 
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and devastating level that they now do. It is time to rethink, based on the 
values used to justify our intellectual property regimes, who should be 
an intended infringer, and develop a common philosophy in copyright to 
that already present in patent and trademark law; one that protects the 
rights of owners, yet is not so overly broad that it entraps individuals it 
was never meant to ensnare. 
This Article argues we should no longer view the copyright 
infringer as the current, single, monolithic group, with regard to both 
liability and damages. Rather, there are several paradigm cases that can 
be used to distinguish different categories of contemporary infringers. 
These categories can be compared to historic innocent infringers and 
non-infringers, as well as to defenses, exceptions, and limits that 
distinguish an infringer from a non-infringer. Part II describes the major 
traditional infringers—non-creative copying mass infringers18 and 
artistic appropriators19—and analogizes the limits of rights of the 
copyright owner in 1976 to the concept of defining rights as they were 
present when enacted. This section also discusses the historic exceptions 
to either infringement or damages: the innocent infringer and the 
historical non-infringers; this section illustrates the dividing line of 
commerciality between what used to distinguish an infringer from a non-
infringer. Part III looks at the metamorphoses of the infringer into its 
contemporary forms. While the intended infringer did not traditionally 
include individuals who copied for personal consumption, they may now 
be subject to the same liability and damages provision that was written 
with commercial, large-scale infringers in mind. This article then 
examines whether the new infringers should continue to be intended 
infringers, and asserts that copyright rights should be limited to those 
granted when the 1976 Act was enacted, and that intended infringers are 
those intended in 1976. Part IV discusses whether the remedies afforded 
for infringement should no longer be “one size fits all” but rather should 
be dependent on which type of infringer is liable. This article argues that 
a modification to the law should be considered to have the liability more 
fitting to the effect of the infringing activity on the copyright owner. 
This article concludes with final thoughts about how the identity of 
infringers changes when technological advancements disrupt the status 
quo and how, to ensure that unintended infringers are not captured, there 
should be a periodic reevaluation. 
18. The Author defines “non-creative copying” as copying for the sake of making an exact
duplicate of a work (either for a “bootleg” or “pirated” distribution or for personal use). 
19. The Author defines “artistic appropriation” as copying and incorporating a work (or a
portion thereof) into one’s own artistic/creative expression. 
6
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II. HISTORICAL INFRINGERS, INNOCENT INFRINGERS, AND NON-
INFRINGERS
The rights of the copyright owner have historically been 
constrained by the technology available at the time of the enactment of 
the particular rendition. These limits defined the historical infringers and 
followed a pattern that is illustrated in the evolution of copyright 
protection, whereby new technologies—such as photography, sound 
recordings and motion pictures—as well as others not based on new 
technology (such as dramatic works) were added to the list of types of 
creative expression that warranted protection.20
A. Historical Infringers
With regard to the reproduction right, this article will focus on
historical infringement falling into two general categories: “artistic 
appropriation” and “non-creative copying.”21 I define the former as 
copying and incorporating a work (or a portion thereof) into one’s own 
artistic/creative expression. The latter I define as copying for the sake of 
making an exact duplicate of a work (either for a “bootleg” or “pirated” 
distribution or for personal use). Dowling’s large-scale bootlegging 
operation in the introduction is an illustration of “non-creative 
copying.”22  As discussed below, there is a commercial nature to both of 
these forms of copyright infringement, inducing Congress to establish 
causes of action for the copyright owner. Now, thanks to digitization, the 
Internet, and other emerging technologies, there are additional targets of 
these infringement claims. 
1. Artistic Appropriation
Artistic appropriators—those who, without authorization,
incorporate the copyrighted works of others into their own creative 
expression—are traditional targets of infringement actions.23 Unlike the 
non-creative copiers,24 however, these artists may have a viable Fair Use 
20. See infra Section II.C.4. 
21. These definitions are for the convenience of the reader, and each has different limits
based on the public policy and incentives for which we have copyright protection. 
22. Dowling v. U.S., 473 U.S. 207 (1985).
23. See, e.g., Bright Tunes Music Corp. v. Harrisongs Music, Ltd., 420 F. Supp. 177
(S.D.N.Y. 1976); Three Boys Music v. Michael Bolton, 212 F.3d 477 (9th Cir. 2000). Other 
examples can be found at Music Copyright Infringement Resource, U.S.C. GOULD SCHOOL OF LAW, 
http://mcir.usc.edu/cases/Pages/default.html (last visited May 1, 2017). 
24. Discussed infra Section IV.
7
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or other defense that is not available to the non-creative copier.25 George 
Harrison’s appropriation of The Chiffons’ melody in “He’s so Fine” for 
his composition “My Sweet Lord,”26 or the Beach Boys’ use of Chuck 
Berry’s melody in “Sweet Little Sixteen” for their “Surfin’ U.S.A,”27
exemplify this form of infringement of the reproduction right.28
In Bright Tunes Music Corp. v. Harrisongs Music, Ltd,29 for 
example, Ronald Mack, composer of the song “He’s So Fine,”30 accused 
George Harrison of unauthorized copying of a copyrightable melody 
portion in Harrison’s 1970 song “My Sweet Lord.”31 There are a 
plethora of examples of artists who infringe on the creative expression of 
others—similar to George Harrison’s copying and appropriation. 
Michael Bolton’s melody “Love is a Wonderful Thing” and Sam 
Smith’s song “Stay With Me” are just as liable today (and should be) for 
their use of the Isley Brothers’ “Love is a Wonderful Thing”32 and Tom 
Petty’s “Won’t Back Down,”33 respectively, as earlier infringing artists 
25. The fair use defense “exempts from liability certain modest uses of copyrighted work
when those uses do not undermine the economic interests of the copyright owner.” ROGER E.
SCHECHTER & JOHN R. THOMAS, PRINCIPLES OF COPYRIGHT LAW 432 (West 2010). Section 107 of 
the Copyright Act provides a non-exclusive list of activities that may fall under the fair use 
exception, “such as criticism, comment, news reporting, teaching . . . or research.” 17 U.S.C. § 107. 
Fair Use and other defenses and their relevance are discussed infra Parts III and IV. 
26. Bright Tunes Music Corp., 420 F. Supp. 177. 
27. Under the threat of a lawsuit, the two parties settled, and Berry eventually received
songwriting credit. Jordan Runtagh, Songs on Trial: 10 Landmark Music Copyright Cases, ROLLING
STONE (June 8, 2016), http://www.rollingstone.com/music/lists/songs-on-trial-10-landmark-music-
copyright-cases-20160608/the-beach-boys-vs-chuck-berry-1963-20160608. 
28. 17 U.S.C. § 106(1) (“the owner of copyright . . . has the exclusive rights . . . to reproduce 
the copyrighted work in copies or phonorecords”). 
29. 420 F. Supp. 177. 
30. In 1963, the sound recording of “He’s So Fine” by The Chiffons was one of the most
popular songs in Great Britain, when Harrison was living in Liverpool, UK. He’s So Fine by The 
Chiffons, SONGFACTS, http://www.songfacts.com/detail.php?id=1215 (last visited Mar. 5, 2017). 
31. Bright Tunes Music Corp., 420 F. Supp. at 178. 
32. Three Boys Music v. Michael Bolton, 212 F.3d 477 (9th Cir. 2000). 
33. Daniel Creps, Sam Smith on Tom Petty Settlement: Similarities but Complete
Coincidence, ROLLING STONE (Jan. 26, 2015), http://www.rollingstone.com/music/news/sam-
smith—tom-petty-settlement-20150126. Sam Smith’s song “Stay with Me” was incredibly similar 
to Tom Petty’s “Won’t Back Down.” The parties avoided litigation and as part of the settlement 
agreement, Tom Petty and Jeff Lynn are now listed as authors of the song along with Sam Smith, 
James Napier, and William Phillips. While Smith—through his attorney—claimed it was a 
coincidence that his song was incredibly similar to Petty’s hit tune, even “unconscious copying” 
results in infringement liability. See Bright Tunes Music Corp., 420 F. Supp. at 181 (“[U]nder the 
law, infringement of copyright . . . is no less so even though subconsciously accomplished.”). 
Tom Petty handled the entire thing with class:  
About the Sam Smith thing. Let me say I have never had any hard feelings toward Sam. 
All my years of songwriting have shown me these things can happen. Most times you 
catch it before it gets out the studio door but in this case it got by. Sam’s people were 
8
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were. Regardless of the technology used to create, disseminate, or 
perform the copies, proving infringement of the reproduction right 
remains as it always was—the defendant copied the copyright owner’s 
creative expression in a way that amounts to unauthorized or unlawful 
appropriation.34 Likewise, for artistic appropriators, the Fair Use defense 
is still available.35
Newer technologies have allowed for smaller and smaller sound 
bites to be used in other creative works that rely on “sampled” music.  
Courts, however, have already adapted to and dealt with this 
phenomenon, and have reaffirmed the parameters for authorized versus 
unauthorized copying. For example, in Newton v. Diamond, the Ninth 
Circuit reaffirmed that “[t]he principle that trivial copying does not 
constitute actionable infringement has long been a part of copyright 
law.”36 The courts have long been able to draw a line whereby the 
quantity taken fails to rise above a trivial amount which no jury would 
recognize as belonging to the copyright owner.37 Thus, there is no reason 
or policy rationale to adjust how liability is determined merely because 
new methods of artistic appropriation are available. For now, courts have 
been able to adequately apply the old principles governing Copyright 
very understanding of our predicament and we easily came to an agreement. The word 
lawsuit was never even said and was never my intention. And no more was to be said 
about it. How it got out to the press is beyond Sam or myself. Sam did the right thing and 
I have thought no more about this. A musical accident no more no less. In these times we 
live in this is hardly news. I wish Sam all the best for his ongoing career. Peace and love 
to all. 
Mark Schneider, Tom Petty Addresses Sam Smith’s Songwriting Snafu: ‘The Word Lawsuit Was 
Never Even Said’, BILLBOARD (Jan. 29, 2015), http://www.billboard.com/articles/news/
6457834/tom-petty-sam-smith-stay-with-me-american-girl-i-wont-back-down (last visited July 29, 
2016). 
34. See Arnstein v. Porter, 154 F.2d 464, 468 (2d Cir. 1946) (holding that, in order to
establish copyright infringement, there are “two separate elements essential to a plaintiff’s case . . . : 
(a) that defendant copied from plaintiff’s copyrighted work and (b) that the copying (assuming it to
be proved) went to far as to constitute improper appropriation.”). There has recently been
disagreement in the courts regarding whether the actual melody or words are copied versus an
artist’s uncopyrightable style, but that is not relevant to this discussion.
35. 17 U.S.C. § 107. 
36. 388 F.3d 1189, 1193 (9th Cir. 2004) (noting that, “as Judge Learned Hand observed over
80 years ago: ‘Even where there is some copying, that fact is not conclusive of infringement. Some 
copying is permitted. In addition to copying, it must be shown that this has been done to an unfair 
extent.’” (citing West Publishing Co. v. Edward Thompson Co., 169 F. 833, 861 (E.D.N.Y. 1909)); 
see also Fisher v. Dees, 794 F.2d 432, 434 (9th Cir. 1986) (“As a rule, a taking is considered de 
minimis only if it is so meager and fragmentary that the average audience would not recognize the 
appropriation.”) 
37. Newton, 388 F.3d at 1193 (noting “[t]his principle reflects the legal maxim, de minimis
non curatlex (often rendered as, “the law does not concern itself with trifles”)) (applying Ringgold 
v. Black Entm’t Television, Inc., 126 F.3d 70, 74–75 (2d Cir. 1997). 
9
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Infringement by artistic appropriators to new technologies. 
2. Unauthorized Mass Reproductions
The second major group that was historically targeted for
infringement actions were those with the resources for large-scale 
unauthorized copying and distribution. They were not the artist and 
creator who appropriated another’s work into their own, but were 
individuals and “businesses” that made unauthorized copies of songs, 
books, sound recordings, and other artistic expression and sold them to 
consumers. Recording equipment was expensive.38 The example supra
in the Article introduction, whereby Dowling and Theaker’s creation and 
sale of thousands of bootlegged songs39 required utilization of a vinyl 
pressing plant, was a typical mass copying operation that was the object 
of infringement actions in the pre-digital age.40
These large undertakings, however, also required large-scale 
publicizing which enabled copyright owners to find these infringers—
Dowling and Theaker even had a catalog which was printed and mailed 
to their potential customers.41 The commercial harm from these 
infringers made them worthwhile to pursue, as exemplified in the 
infringement of the distribution right that occurred in Fonovisa v. Cherry 
Auction.42
38. Henry H. Perritt, Jr., New Business Models for Music, 18 VILL. SPORTS & ENT. L.J. 63,
73 (2011) (“[M]anufacturing the vinyl disks from the master recording was a big deal, and within 
the capability of only a handful of pressing plants.”). 
39. Dowling v. U.S., 739 F.2d 1445, 1446-47 (9th Cir. 1984) (“[D]uring 1979-80 Dowling
mailed hundreds of packages of albums every week. The mailings ranged from one record to 
packages weighing 20 to 30 pounds each. Dowling was spending at least $1,000 per week on 
postage during this period.”). In 1979, First Class postage was $0.15/ounce. Rates for Domestic 
Letters Since 1863, U.S. POSTAL SERVICE, https://about.usps.com/who-we-are/postal-
history/domestic-letter-rates-since-1863.pdf (last visited August 20, 2016). If Dowling and Theaker 
were averaging over $1,000 per week in postage, that is approximately 416 pounds of bootleg 
phonorecords sent weekly. The typical vinyl record (including its jacket) weighs approximately 7.8 
ounces (the Author weighed several of her own vinyl albums, and determined the average). Even if 
one conservatively brought that weight up to one pound to account for shipping materials, that 
would mean that Theaker and Dowling were shipping at least 400 bootleg albums each week for 
two years, or over 40,000 bootleg albums during the two years of operation from 1979-1980. 
40. Sculptural works were also targets of unauthorized mass reproduction. In Mazer v. Stein, 
for example, Emanuel Mazer mass-produced unauthorized copies of sculptures created by Benjamin 
and Rita Stein. Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201, 205 (1954). 
41. Dowling, 739 F.2d at 1446 (“At the direction of both Dowling and Theaker, Send
Service, an addressing and mailing service located in Glendale, California, mailed over 50,000 
catalogs and flyers advertising defendants’ phonorecords. The catalogs were mailed throughout the 
United States during 1979 and 1980. Theaker collected the orders and then sent them to Dowling 
who mailed the requested albums from Maryland.”) Id. 
42. 845 F. Supp. 1492 (E.D. Cal. 1994). 
10
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In Fonovisa, one police raid seized over 38,000 counterfeit tapes 
being sold at a swap meet in Fresno County, California, and later 
witnessed several independent vendors conducting sales of counterfeit 
copyrighted phonorecords at the same swap meet.43 Pre-internet, in order 
to sell their wares, these unauthorized distributors needed open public 
venues, and large volumes of sales to justify the expenses involved in 
creating the bootlegged and counterfeited phonorecords. The sales 
volume and its effect on a copyright owner’s profits justified legal 
action. Again, in Sony Discos, Inc. v. E.J.C. Family Partnership, a 2001 
police raid at a flea market in Pearland, Texas44 resulted in the seizure of 
2,200 counterfeit cassette tapes and compact discs.45  This raid was also 
the result of countless hours of investigators observing infringing 
activities at the flea market to accumulate evidence against the 
infringers.46
3. Not Worth the Effort: Bad Unlawful Copies for Personal Use
When I was in high school in the early 1980s, a cute boy47 who had
a crush on me gave me a present—knowing I was a Pink Floyd fan, he 
copied his “The Wall” album onto a pair of cassette tapes and gave them 
to me. The quality was just so-so, and the approximately 80-minute 
album48 took him even longer than that to make the copy—the boy’s 
efforts in making this copy were not inconsequential.49 There was no 
way the owners of the copyrights in those songs would have ever known 
about this infringing action, and any person in a similar circumstance 
would be almost impossible to locate and be found liable for this form of 
copyright infringement. 
In addition to the difficulty in locating unauthorized tape copiers, 
43. Id. at 1494. On their various visits to the Cherry Auction swap meet between 1991 and
1993, Fresno County Sheriff’s deputies regularly witnessed ten to twelve vendors selling 
counterfeits.  
44. Michael Alterio, Flea market beats music giant Sony in copyright suit, FLEA MARKET 
ZONE (April 16, 2010), http://fleamarketzone.com/2010/04/coles-v-sony/. 
45. Sony Discos, Inc. v. E.J.C. Family P’ship, 2010 WL 12703442 (S.D. Tex. 2010). Unlike
in Fonovisa, where the flea market owner was found contributorily liable, the defendants in Sony 
Discos did not benefit from the sale of the counterfeit goods, and therefore were not found liable as 
third-party infringers.  
46. Id. at *1; see also Arista Records, Inc. v. Flea World, Inc., 78 U.S.P.Q.2d 1339 (D.N.J.
2006). 
47. Even though the statute of limitations has long passed, to protect his identity as a
copyright infringer, the boy’s name will remain anonymous. 
48. The Wall, WIKIPEDIA, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/The_Wall (last visited July 27,
2016). 
49. He never asked me out, though. 
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the poor quality of the copies and the amount of time required to make 
an individual copy limited the harm to the copyright owners. My taped 
songs degraded quickly, and after a few months, I ended up buying my 
own copy of The Wall. We made “mix tapes” and recorded off the radio; 
we were infringers, but we slipped below the radar. The Copyright Act 
never intended for our actions to incur liability for infringement. 
If individuals made unauthorized copies, the scale and quality of 
copying—and the enormous difficulty of even identifying these small-
time infringers—made any action in copyright a worthless endeavor. As 
we will discuss infra, however, with the advent of technologies that 
make high quality, fast copying a common commodity, individual small-
scale infringers are caught in a trap that had previously been set solely 
for large-scale infringers who had economic incentives to make 
unauthorized copies. 
In addition to boys making cassette tapes for girls they liked, there 
was also a tradition of using well-known tunes as the melody for other 
songs—which legally would also constitute infringement of the 
reproduction and adaptation rights.50 Historically, most of these “artistic 
appropriations” would be difficult to discover. Camp songs were sung 
around a fire by young boys and girls who created their own lyrics—
those lyrics were written down and passed along year after year, as well 
as passing under the radar of the copyright owners, the creator of the 
new lyrics lost through time.51 These elusive infringers were not viable 
targets for copyright owners, which should be a relief to those who long 
ago created and sang the unauthorized derivative works.52
B. Historical Innocent Infringers
The limitations on copyrightability itself illustrate that Congress
has, at times, condoned certain forms of unauthorized copying53 beyond 
50. 17 U.S.C. § 106(1)-(2) (“The owner of copyright under this title has the exclusive rights
to do and to authorize any of the following: (1) to reproduce the copyrighted work in copies or 
phonorecords; (2) to prepare derivative works based upon the copyrighted work.”).  
51. The author’s own experience included camp songs sung to the tune of the Notre Dame
Fight Song, among others.  
52. Most likely the campfire singing would not be considered a “public performance,” 
relieving the campers of liability under §106(4), the right “to perform the copyrighted work 
publicly.” But if a Youtube video of this activity were posted, thereby exposing the infringement, 
should campers today face infringement liability? 
53. Melvin L. Halpern, The Sound Recording Act of 1971: An End to Piracy on the High
©’s?, 40 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 964 (1971-72) (noting that—until the enactment of the Sound 
Recording Act of 1971 (Pub. L. No. 92-140, 85 Stat. 391 (1971))—sound recordings were not 
protected under copyright law. Only the underlying musical composition received protection.).  
12
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the traditional defenses such as Fair Use. This section will discuss 
several of these relevant innocent infringers—those infringers who did 
so under the mistaken belief that their actions did not constitute 
infringement. Subpart C explores exceptions to copyright infringement, 
where Congress has placed limits on actions that would otherwise be 
considered infringing actions. In both these sub-sections, the non-
commercial nature of the defendants’ actions plays a key role in that 
determination, either removing liability or limiting damages as a 
remedy. 
1. Consequences of Notice Failure at the Enactment of the 1976
Act
In the 1970s, when Congress conducted its most recent major 
drafting of the Copyright Act, legislators continued to have a particular 
image of infringement for the reproduction, adaptation, distribution, 
public performance, and public display rights. Especially with regard to 
the reproduction right, there was concern that the statute’s changes to the 
formalities surrounding copyright protection would capture innocent 
infringers who were accustomed to the former regime, where lack of 
copyright notice rendered a work in the public domain. As Congress 
noted, unlike the current law at the time—the Copyright Act of 1909 
(1909 Act)54—under the proposed revision, “omission of a copyright 
notice [did] not automatically forfeit protection and throw the work into 
the public domain.”55 Instead, authors had a five-year grace period to 
remedy the lack of notice,56 and lack of notice on the work no longer 
54. Copyright Act of 1909, Pub. L. 60-349, 35 Stat. 1075 [hereinafter Copyright Act of
1909]. 
55. H.R. REP. 94-1476, H.R. Rep. No. 1476, 94TH Cong., 2ND Sess. 1976, 1976
U.S.C.C.A.N. 5659, 5762-63. 
56. 17 U.S.C. § 405(a): 
Effect of Omission on Copyright. — With respect to copies and phonorecords publicly
distributed by authority of the copyright owner before the effective date of the Berne
Convention Implementation Act of 1988, the omission of the copyright notice described
in sections 401 through 403 from copies or phonorecords publicly distributed by authori-
ty of the copyright owner does not invalidate the copyright in a work if 
(1) the notice has been omitted from no more than a relatively small number of copies or
phonorecords distributed to the public; or
(2) registration for the work has been made before or is made within five years after the
publication without notice, and a reasonable effort is made to add notice to all copies or
phonorecords that are distributed to the public in the United States after the omission has
been discovered.
See also H.R. REP. 94-1476, H.R. Rep. No. 1476, 94TH Cong., 2ND Sess. 1976, 1976 
U.S.C.C.A.N. 5659, 5762-63 (“Under the proposed law a work published without any copyright 
notice will still be subject to statutory protection for at least 5 years, whether the omission was 
13
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guaranteed that the work was free to copy. “This not only represents a 
major change in the theoretical framework of American copyright law, 
but it also seems certain to have immediate practical consequences in a 
great many individual cases.”57
Because of this change to the law regarding the grace period for 
remedying the lack of notice, Congress expressed concern that those 
who relied on a lack of actual notice of registration that was later cured 
could be liable for their “innocent infringement.” Who did Congress 
envision these innocent infringers to be? The legislators divided these 
“innocent infringers” into two groups: (1) those for whom the 
infringement had been short-lived and had limited ability to research for 
a cured omission, and (2) those who would have ongoing use of the 
work and would also be better able to research and determine if the 
notice omission had been cured. 
2. “Innocent” Individuals
For the former group, Congress established limited damages
liability under Section 405(b) of the Act,58 and in certain cases, the court 
partial or total, unintentional or deliberate.”). 
57. H.R. REP. 94-1476, H.R. Rep. No. 1476, 94TH Cong., 2ND Sess. 1976, 1976
U.S.C.C.A.N. 5659, 5762-63. 
58. 17 U.S.C. § 405(b) Effect of Omission on Innocent Infringers. —
Any person who innocently infringes a copyright, in reliance upon an authorized copy or
phonorecord from which the copyright notice has been omitted and which was publicly
distributed by authority of the copyright owner before the effective date of the Berne
Convention Implementation Act of 1988, incurs no liability for actual or statutory dam-
ages under section 504 for any infringing acts committed before receiving actual notice
that registration for the work has been made under section 408, if such person proves
that he or she was misled by the omission of notice. In a suit for infringement in such a
case the court may allow or disallow recovery of any of the infringer’s profits attributa-
ble to the infringement, and may enjoin the continuation of the infringing undertaking or
may require, as a condition for permitting the continuation of the infringing undertaking,
that the infringer pay the copyright owner a reasonable license fee in an amount and on
terms fixed by the court. 
See also H.R. REP. 94-1476, H.R. Rep. No. 1476, 94TH Cong., 2ND Sess. 1976, 1976 
U.S.C.C.A.N. 5659, 5764: 
The general postulates underlying [Section 405(b)] are that a person acting in good faith 
and with no reason to think otherwise should ordinarily be able to assume that a work is 
in the public domain if there is no notice on an authorized copy or phonorecord and that, 
if he relies on this assumption, he should be shielded from unreasonable liability.  
Under section 405(b) an innocent infringer who acts ‘in reliance upon an authorized 
copy or phonorecord from which the copyright notice has been omitted ‘, and who 
proves that he was misled by the omission, is shielded from liability for actual or statuto-
ry damages with respect to ‘any infringing acts committed before receiving actual no-
tice’ of registration. Thus, where the infringement is completed before actual notice has 
been served— as would be the usual case with respect to relatively minor infringements 
14
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was prohibited from exacting damages at all.59 In its legislative history 
of Section 504(c)(2), Congress took note of 
the special situation of teachers, librarians, archivists, and public 
broadcasters, and the nonprofit institutions of which they are a part. 
Section 504 (c)(2) provides that, where such a person or institution in-
fringed copyrighted material in the honest belief that what they were 
doing constituted fair use, the court is precluded from awarding any 
statutory damages.60
Thus, individuals received a broad exemption from liability based 
on lack of notice, even to the point where no damages were to be 
awarded the copyright owner. It is noteworthy that those individuals or 
non-profit entities that received this exemption were using the 
copyrighted work in a non-commercial manner. One can conclude, 
therefore, that protecting unauthorized commercialization was one of 
Congress’ major policy objectives when it drafted the Copyright Act. 
3. “Innocent” Ongoing Concerns
For the latter group—those ongoing concerns—Congress deemed
them sufficiently sophisticated to face more substantial damages. These 
were for-profit entities that sought to commercialize and financially 
benefit from the copyrighted works, and generally had a profit-seeking 
motive accounting for the company’s existence. For these “innocent 
infringers” who copied either during the “grace period” of notice 
omission or relied on lack of notice on a copy, 
by teachers, librarians, journalists, and the like— liability, if any, would be limited to the 
profits the infringer realized from the act of infringement.  
59. 17 U.S.C. § 504(c)(2): 
In a case where the infringer sustains the burden of proving, and the court finds, that
such infringer was not aware and had no reason to believe that his or her acts constituted
an infringement of copyright, the court in its discretion may reduce the award of statuto-
ry damages to a sum of not less than $200. The court shall remit statutory damages in
any case where an infringer believed and had reasonable grounds for believing that his or 
her use of the copyrighted work was a fair use under section 107, if the infringer was: (i)
an employee or agent of a nonprofit educational institution, library, or archives acting
within the scope of his or her employment who, or such institution, library, or archives
itself, which infringed by reproducing the work in copies or phonorecords; or (ii) a pub-
lic broadcasting entity which or a person who, as a regular part of the nonprofit activities
of a public broadcasting entity. . . infringed by performing a published nondramatic liter-
ary work or by reproducing a transmission program embodying a performance of such a
work.
60. H.R. REP. 94-1476, H.R. Rep. No. 1476, 94TH Cong., 2ND Sess. 1976, 1976
U.S.C.C.A.N. 5659, 5764. 
15
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[w]here the infringing enterprise is one running over a period of time,
the copyright owner would be able to seek an injunction against con-
tinuation of the infringement, and to obtain full monetary recovery for
all infringing acts committed after he had served notice of registration.
Persons who undertake major enterprises of this sort should check the
Copyright Office registration records before starting, even where cop-
ies have been published without notice.61
This is in harmony with their concept of how infringement was harming 
the recording industry in particular via large-scale bootlegging 
operations, and these should be the targets for the economic harm they 
cause to the copyright owner. This position is also illustrated in how 
damages were delineated in the statute for profit-making entities. 
“Where an infringer made profits from infringing acts committed 
innocently before receiving notice from the copyright owner, the court 
may allow or withhold their recovery in light of the circumstances.”62
Courts had the option of enjoining the defendant from continuing the 
infringing activity, or requiring that the defendant pay a reasonable 
royalty and continue its operation.63
Congress described these large-scale innocent infringers when it set 
forth limited statutory damages in Section 504(c)(2) for this group. 
Unlike the librarians and the like, there was no waiver of statutory 
damages for these “innocent infringers.” The exception to statutory 
damages for this group both placed the burden on the defendant, and did 
not completely remove the damages remedy.64
The exception, which would allow reduction of minimum statutory 
damages . . . where the infringer ‘was not aware and had no reason to 
believe that his or her acts constituted an infringement of copyright,’ is 
sufficient to protect against unwarranted liability in cases of occasional 
or isolated innocent infringement, and it offers adequate insulation to 
users, such as broadcasters and newspaper publishers, who are particu-
larly vulnerable to this type of infringement suit. On the other hand, by 
61. Id. (emphasis added). 
62. 17 U.S.C. § 405(b) (“In a suit for infringement in such a case [of innocent infringement]
the court may allow or disallow recovery of any of the infringer’s profits attributable to the 
infringement, and may enjoin the continuation of the infringing undertaking or may require, as a 
condition for permitting the continuation of the infringing undertaking, that the infringer pay the 
copyright owner a reasonable license fee in an amount and on terms fixed by the court.”). 
63. H.R. REP. 94-1476, H.R. Rep. No. 1476, 94TH Cong., 2ND Sess. 1976, 1976
U.S.C.C.A.N. 5659, 5764.  
64. 17 U.S.C. § 504(c)(2) (“In a case where the infringer sustains the burden of proving, and
the court finds, that such infringer was not aware and had no reason to believe that his or her acts 
constituted an infringement of copyright, the court in its discretion may reduce the award of 
statutory damages to a sum of not less than $200.”). 
16
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establishing a realistic floor for liability, the provision preserves its in-
tended deterrent effect; and it would not allow an infringer to escape 
simply because the plaintiff failed to disprove the defendant’s claim of 
innocence.65
Thus, Congress viewed the innocent infringer who still deserved to 
suffer from some monetary damages as the commercial infringer, while 
proscribing courts from eliciting monetary damages on singular non-
commercial use by an innocent infringer. 
C. Historical Non-Infringers
While Subpart B discussed the limits of liability for innocent
infringers, in this subsection we look at historical exceptions to 
copyright infringement, where Congress has placed limits on actions that 
would otherwise be considered infringing actions. This section also 
continues the overarching theme: a lack of commercialization of the 
defendants’ actions is a commonality in creating these categories of non-
infringers and differentiating them from the intended infringer. 
1. General Economic Incentive Theories of IP Protection
The Supreme Court first rejected a natural rights theory66 of
intellectual property in favor of economic incentives in Wheaton v. 
Peters,67 and reiterated its rejection of a natural rights theory in Fox Film 
65. H.R. REP. 94-1476, H.R. Rep. No. 1476, 94TH Cong., 2ND Sess. 1976, 1976
U.S.C.C.A.N. 5659, 5764. 
66. A “natural right” is a right that exists independent of legislative enactment, even if there
are legislative enactments, and usually first attributed to John Locke. See JOHN LOCKE, SECOND 
TREATISE OF GOVERNMENT (1690): 
The “labour” of his body and the “work” of his hands, we may say, are properly his. 
Whatsoever, then, he removes out of the state that Nature hath provided and left it in, he 
hath mixed his labour with it, and joined to it something that is his own, and thereby 
makes it his property. It being by him removed from the common state Nature placed it 
in, it hath by this labour something annexed to it that excludes the common right of other 
men. For this “labour” being the unquestionable property of the labourer, no man but he 
can have a right to what that is once joined to, at least where there is enough, and as 
good left in common for others. 
As applied to intellectual property, the Natural Rights Theory stresses the inherent authority of 
innovators to control works they have created. Id. 
67. 33 U.S. 591, 661 (1834): 
[C]ongress, in passing the act of 1790, did not legislate in reference to existing
rights . . . . Now if this exclusive right existed at common law, and congress were about 
to adopt legislative provisions for its protection, would they have used this language? 
Could they have deemed it necessary to vest a right already vested. Such a presumption 
is refuted by the words above quoted, and their force is not lessened by any other part of 
the act. 
17
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Corp. v. Doyal:68 “[C]opyright is the creature of the federal statute 
passed in the exercise of the power vested in the Congress. As this Court 
has repeatedly said, the Congress did not sanction an existing right, but 
created a new one.”69
A great many scholars have written about the underlying economic 
incentive theories behind copyright protection and their application to a 
variety of copyright issues.70  Some like to quote Samuel Johnson’s 
famous adage, “[n]o man but a blockhead ever wrote, except for 
money.”71 In general, the underlying rationale for the economic 
incentive theory is that obtaining protection as well as the ability to 
enforce one’s copyright rights is based on the author’s desire to seek 
economic benefits from her creative endeavor, whether or not the 
alleged infringer was financially benefiting from her use of the work.72
“[C]opyright law celebrates the profit motive, recognizing that the 
incentive to profit from the exploitation of copyrights will redound to the 
public benefit by resulting in the proliferation of knowledge.”73
Congress, then, by this act, instead of sanctioning an existing right, as contended for, created it. This 
seems to be the clear import of the law, connected with the circumstances under which it was 
enacted. Id.  
68. 286 U.S. 123 (1932). 
69. Id. at 127; see also Am. Tobacco Co. v. Werkmeister, 207 U.S. 284, 291 (1907) (“[i]n 
this country it is well settled that property in copyright is the creation of the Federal statute passed 
in the exercise of the power vested in Congress by the Federal Constitution in article I, § 8.”). 
70. See, e.g., Minjeong Kim, Show Me the Money: The Economics of Copyright in Online
News, 58 J. COPYRIGHT SOC’Y U.S.A. 301 (2011); Steven Hetcher, Desire Without Hierarchy: The 
Behavioral Economics of Copyright Incentives, 48 U. LOUISVILLE L. REV. 817, 817 (2010); Alina 
Ng, The Author’s Rights in Literary and Artistic Works, 9 J. MARSHALL REV. INTELL. PROP. L. 453, 
461 (2010); Richard Watt, Copyright and Contract Law: Economic Theory of Copyright Contracts, 
18 J. INTELL. PROP. L. 173 (2010); Christopher S. Yoo, Copyright and Public Good Economics: A 
Misunderstood Relation, 155 U. PA. L. REV. 635 (2007); Matthew J. Sag, Beyond Abstraction: The 
Law and Economics of Copyright Scope and Doctrinal Efficiency, 81 TUL. L. REV. 187 (2006); 
Douglas Lichtman, William Landes, Indirect Liability for Copyright Infringement: An Economic 
Perspective, 16 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 395 (2003); Edward Samuels, Economic Justice: Copyright 
Owners, Performers, and Users, 22 N.Y.L. SCH. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 379 (2003); William M. 
Landes, Copyright, Borrowed Images, and Appropriation Art: An Economic Approach, 9 GEO.
MASON L. REV. 1 (2000); Adam R. Fox, The Economics of Expression and the Future of Copyright 
Law, 25 OHIO N.U. L. REV. 5 (1999); Stanley M. Besen, An Economic Analysis of Copyright 
Collectives, 78 VA. L. REV. 383 (1992); Frank P. Darr, Testing an Economic Theory of Copyright: 
Historical Materials and Fair Use, 32 B.C. L. REV. 1027 (1991). 
71. Alina Ng, The Author’s Rights in Literary and Artistic Works, 9 J. MARSHALL REV.
INTELL. PROP. L. 453, 461 (2010), citing JAMES BOSWELL, II, BOSWELL’S LIFE OF JOHNSON, 14 
(Henry Frowde ed., Oxford 1904) (1791).  
72. C.f. id. at 467-68 (“Noting that the author seeks to recover her cost of investing in the
creation and production of creative works, and receives remuneration from her readers through the 
copyright system.”). 
73. Am. Geophysical Union v. Texaco Inc., 802 F. Supp. 1, 27 (S.D.N.Y. 1992), amended
(Oct. 26, 1992), aff’d, 37 F.3d 881 (2d Cir. 1994), order amended and superseded, 60 F.3d 913 (2d 
18
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2. Commercialization as the Dividing Line for Protection Prior to
1978
Using commercialization as the dividing line—either for liability or 
for a determination of damages—would fall in line with the intention of 
copyright to protect the commercial and creative interests of artists under 
the economic incentive theory adopted by Congress. Under the 1909 
Act,74 federal copyright protection was triggered with publication of the 
work.75
For example, in American Tobacco Co. v. Werckmeister,76
publication of copies for sale was differentiated from individual 
paintings, the latter which “are often sold to private individuals and go 
into private collections, whilst the copies, photographs, or 
photogravures, may have a wide and extended sale.”77 At issue was 
whether a painting that lacked the copyright notice on its face fell into 
the public domain. The Supreme Court held that it did not.78
Until the passage of the 1976 Act—and the removal of all 
formalities with the enactment of the Berne Convention Implementation 
Act of 198879—federal copyright protection for a work depended on 
compliance with strict formalities. Indeed, under the 1909 Act,80 federal 
copyright protection itself was not available until the work was 
published to the general public. Professors Brauneis and Schechter have 
succinctly described the meaning of this dividing line: 
The question of publication was central to the entire scheme of the 
1909 Copyright Statute—as the Ninth Circuit put it, it was of “im-
mense importance.” Under the 1909 law, publication was the dividing 
line between perpetual protection under state law and either of two 
possibilities under federal law: Publication with a valid copyright no-
tice would terminate or “divest” the common law copyright and “in-
Cir. 1994), and aff’d, 60 F.3d 913 (2d Cir. 1994). 
74. Copyright Act of 1909. 
75. See ROBERT BRAUNEIS & ROGER SCHECHTER, COPYRIGHT: A CONTEMPORARY
APPROACH 471 (West Academic Publishing 2012). 
76. 207 U.S. 284 (1907). 
77. Id. at 294 (“It would seem clear that the real object of the statute is not to give notice to
the artist or proprietor of the painting or the person to whose collection it may go, who need no 
information, but to notify the public who purchase the circulated copies of the existing copyright, in 
order that their ownership may be restricted.”)  
78. Id.
79. Pub. L. 100-568 (1988). See generally Jane C. Ginsburg, The US Experience with
Copyright Formalities: A Love/Hate Relationship (Columbia Law Sch. Pub. Law & Legal Theory 
Working Paper, Paper NO. 9181, 2010), http://lsr.nellco.org/columbia_pllt/9181. 
80. Acts prior to the 1909 Act also had this commercialization dividing line, often with
harsher requirements to avoid a work falling into the Public Domain. 
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vest” federal statutory copyright of the limited period specified in the 
statute. Alternatively, publication without notice would also terminate 
the common law copyright, but operated as well to forfeit any federal 
statutory copyright and inject the work into the public domain.81
Prior copyright acts had even harsher formalities, all of which was for 
the purpose of protecting the economic interests of U.S. citizens. First, 
the Copyright Act of 1790 made protection available only to an author 
who was “a citizen or citizens of these United States, or resident 
therein,”82 thus forbidding copyright protection for works created by 
foreign authors. Formalities also required “that no person shall be 
entitled to the benefit of this act . . . unless he shall before publication 
deposit a printed copy of the title of such map, chart, book or books, in 
the clerk’s office of the district court where the author or proprietor shall 
reside.”83 Eventually, in 1855, deposit could be accomplished by mail 
and could be done simultaneously with publication.84
Commercialization as the delineation for protection under the 
federal regime began with the first sentence of the first copyright act: 
“Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United 
States of America in Congress assembled, That from and after the 
passing of this act, the author and authors of any map, chart, book or 
books . . . shall have the sole right and liberty of printing, reprinting, 
publishing and vending.”85 There was “a dual system of ‘common law 
copyright’ for unpublished works and statutory copyright for published 
works, which has been the system in effect in the United States since the 
first copyright statute in 1790.”86 Until 1978, unpublished works were 
treated as privacy interests, protected by common law.87
81. BRAUNEIS & SCHECHTER, supra note 75, at 471 (emphasis in original), citing Am.
Vitagraph, Inc. v. Levy, 659 F.2d 1023, 1026 (9th Cir. 1981). 
82. 1790 Copyright Act (Act of May 31, 1790), ch. 15, § 1, 1 Stat. 124 [hereinafter Copyright 
Act of 1790]. 
83. Id. at Sec. 3. 
84. AN ACT making appropriations for the service of the Post-Office Department during the 
fiscal year, ending the thirtieth of June, one thousand eight hundred and fifty-six, Sec. 5. (“And be it 
further enacted, That all books, maps, charts, or other publications, entered for copyright, and 
which, under the act of August tenth, eighteen hundred and forty-six, are required to be deposited in 
the Library of Congress, and in the Smithsonian Institution, may be sent through the mails free of 
postage, under Much regulations as the Postmaster-General may prescribe.”). 
85. Copyright Act of 1790. 
86. H.R. REP. 94-1476, H.R. Rep. No. 1476, 94TH Cong., 2ND Sess. 1976, 1976
U.S.C.C.A.N. 5659, 5764. 
87. See, e.g., Copyright Act of 1909, Sec. 2 (“Nothing in this title shall be construed to annul 
or limit the right of the author or proprietor of an unpublished work, at common law, or in equity, to 
prevent the copyright, publication, or use of such unpublished work without his consent, and to 
obtain damages hereafter.”); BRAUNEIS & SCHECHTER, supra note 75. 
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3. Private Performance Non-Infringers
Based on the private nature of the performance, copyright law does
not label a person who invites friends and family to listen to a sound 
recording during a dinner party as an infringer.88 Implicit in this private 
performance exemption is the lack of a for-profit nature, or the ability of 
the copyright owner to learn about the performance or demonstrate harm 
by the performance. There is also an element of a right to privacy 
implied in this exemption—we value our privacy, and the ability to 
perform silly dances or sing in the shower in the privacy of our homes 
should not open us up to infringement liability. Copyright owners suffer 
no meaningful economic harm through these performances. 
Under the 1909 Act, protecting privacy and tying copyright to 
commercial exploitation and economic incentives was resolved by 
limiting the public performance right to the exclusive right “to perform 
or represent the copyrighted work publicly for profit if it be a musical 
composition.”89 In addition, Section 1(b) provided a similar “for profit” 
limitation for nondramatic literary works.90 Thus, the “for profit nature” 
was the dividing line for both protection and creating actionable 
infringement. The public performance right under the 1909 Act provided 
the exclusive right “to perform or represent the copyrighted work 
publicly for profit if it be a musical composition.”91 In addition, Section 
1(b) provided a similar “for profit” requirement for nondramatic literary 
works to be infringing,92 which was reiterated with the enactment of the 
Sound Recording Act of 1971.93 The commercial nature of reproduction 
88. 17 U.S.C. § 101 (“To perform or display a work “publicly” means . . . to perform or
display it at a place open to the public or at any place where a substantial number of persons outside 
of a normal circle of a family and its social acquaintances is gathered.”); see also Nat’l Football 
League v. McBee & Bruno’s, Inc., 792 F.2d 726, 729 (8th Cir. 1986) (noting that on one of the 
dates when one of the defendant used his bar’s “satellite dish to intercept the blacked-out home 
game played . . . his establishment . . . [did] not have a Sunday liquor license and [was] not open for 
business on Sunday; on that date, the bar was closed and the game watched only by [the defendant] 
and three friends. . . . and . . . such a viewing is not a public performance under Section 101 of the 
Copyright Act.”). 
89. Copyright Act of 1909 § 1(e).
90. §1(b) (“Any person entitled thereto . . . shall have the exclusive right to deliver, authorize 
the delivery of, read, or present the copyrighted work in public for profit, if it be a lecture, sermon, 
address or similar production, or other nondramatic literary work . . . by any method . . . and to play 
or perform it in public for profit.”). 
91. §1(e).
92. §1(b) (“Any person entitled thereto . . . shall have the exclusive right to deliver, authorize 
the delivery of, read, or present the copyrighted work in public for profit, if it be a lecture, sermon, 
address or similar production, or other nondramatic literary work . . . by any method . . . and to play 
or perform it in public for profit.”). 
93. §1(f) (“Any person entitled thereto . . . shall have the exclusive right to produce and
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or distribution of the sound recording was a requirement for this right to 
be infringed.94
This “for profit” requirement seemed to have been removed, but 
actually remained, though it was extremely narrowed through the 
inclusion of Section 110 of the 1976 Act, providing exemptions for non-
profit performances such as non-profit educational institutions,95
religious services,96 and other non-profit enterprises.97 Congress 
declared and explained this change: 
The right of public performance under section 106(4) . . . unlike the 
equivalent provisions now in effect, is not limited by any ‘for profit’ 
requirement. The approach of the bill . . . is first to state the public per-
formance right in broad terms, and then to provide specific exemptions 
for educational and other nonprofit uses. 
This approach is more reasonable than the outright exemption of the 
1909 statute. The line between commercial and ‘nonprofit’ organiza-
tions is increasingly difficult to draw. Many ‘non-profit’ organizations 
are highly subsidized and capable of paying royalties, and the wide-
spread public exploitation of copyrighted works by public broadcasters 
and other noncommercial organizations is likely to grow.98
In Congress’ pivot away from a “for profit” requirement for 
infringement of the public performance right, it recognized that, with 
emerging technologies and the expansive role that television and radio 
were having in how individuals viewed or heard public performances—
no longer limited to viewing them live—public performances would 
“supplant markets for printed copies and that in the future a broad ‘not 
for profit ‘ exemption could not only hurt authors but could dry up their 
distribute to the public by sale or other transfer of ownership, or by rental, lease or lending, 
reproductions of the copyrighted work if it be a sound recording.”). 
94. §104(b) (“Any person who willfully and for profit shall infringe any copyright provided
by Section 1(f)”). 
95. Copyright Act of 1976 § 110(1)-(2), Pub. L. No. 94-553, 90 Stat. 2541 (1976). 
96. § 110(3). 
97. § 110(4) (“Notwithstanding the provisions of section 106, the following are not
infringements of copyright: performance of a nondramatic literary or musical work otherwise than 
in a transmission to the public, without any purpose of direct or indirect commercial advantage and 
without any payment of any fee or other compensation for the performance to any of its performers, 
promoters or organizers, if (A) there is no direct or indirect admission charge; or (B) the proceeds, 
after deducting the reasonable costs of producing the performance, are used exclusively for 
educational, religious, or charitable purposes and not for private financial gain, except where the 
copyright owner has served notice of objection to the performance.”). 
98. H.R. REP. 94-1476, H.R. Rep. No. 1476, 94TH Cong., 2ND Sess. 1976, 1976
U.S.C.C.A.N. 5659, 5764. 
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incentive to write.99
Under the 1976 Act, garage bands that played “concerts” for their 
friends would not be “intended infringers.”100 Their performances would 
most likely not be considered a “public” performance,101 even if the 
concert could be classified as “public” or the copyright owner would be 
unaware of the infringing activity. The copyright owner would have no 
cause of action regarding her reproduction, adaptation, or distribution 
rights due to the unfixed nature of the performances.102 Under the 1909 
Act, the lack of performing “for profit” would save these musicians from 
infringement liability. 
4. Unprotected Works and Legal Copying
Congress has clearly desired that certain forms of copying be
allowed. Beyond our current Fair Use doctrine, there is a historical 
record of Congress protecting only certain forms of expression from 
unauthorized copying. Early iterations of the Copyright Act also placed 
hurdles in the way of those looking to secure rights, thereby allowing 
more works to enter the public domain, available for all to copy. The 
first Copyright Act of 1790 protected only maps, charts and books.103
Copyrightable subject matter was expanded to include musical 
compositions in 1831104 and to public performances in dramatic 
compositions in 1856.105 Photographs were included in 1865,106 and 
99. Id.
100. See, e.g., Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 468-69 
(1984).  
101. 17 U.S.C. § 101 (“to perform or display a work ‘publicly’ means to perform or display it
at a place open to the public or at any place where a substantial number of persons outside of a 
normal circle of family and its social acquaintances are gathered.”). 
102. H.R. REP. 94-1476, H.R. Rep. No. 1476, 94TH Cong., 2ND Sess. 1976, 1976
U.S.C.C.A.N. 5659, 5764 (“[A]n unfixed work of authorship, such as an improvisation or an 
unrecorded choreographic work, performance, or broadcast, would continue to be subject to 
protection under State common law or statute, but would not be eligible for Federal statutory 
protection under section 102.”). 
103. Copyright Act of 1790, § 1. 
104. White-Smith Music Pub. Co. v. Apollo Co, 209 U.S. 1, 15 (1908) (“[m]usical 
compositions have been the subject of copyright protection since the statute of February 3, 1831 (4 
Stat. at L. 436, chap. 16).”). 
105. An act to amend the several acts respecting copyright, approved February third, eighteen
hundred and thirty-one, enacted August 18, 1856: 
Be it enacted ~ the Senate ~ House of Representatives of the United States of America in 
Congress assembled, That any copyright hereafter granted under the laws of the United 
States to the author or proprietor of any dramatic composition, designed or suited for 
public representation, shall be deemed and taken to confer upon the said author or pro-
prietor. . . along with the sole right to print and publish the said composition, the sole 
right also to act, perform, or represent the same, or cause it to be acted, performed, or 
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motion pictures became protectable subject matter in 1912.107
At the time of its enactment, works that could not be viewed with 
the human eye were not protected under the 1909 Act. In White-Smith 
Music Pub. Co. v. Apollo,108 the Supreme Court was faced with its first 
consideration of whether a work that could not be “perceived, 
reproduced, or otherwise communicated . . . with the aid of a machine or 
device”109 should be considered the “writings of an author.”110 The 
Apollo Company sold “player pianos and perforated rolls of music used 
in connection therewith.”111  At the turn of the century, player pianos 
and the rolls were extremely popular. In “1902 from seventy to seventy-
five thousand of such instruments were in use in the United States 
and . . . from one million to one million and a half of such perforated 
musical rolls . . . were made in this country in that year.”112 White-Smith 
Music Publishing Company held the copyrights in several of the 
compositions that Apollo used on the player piano rolls.113
A lot was at stake in this decision. If Apollo could create the player 
piano rolls of copyrighted musical compositions without paying 
royalties to the copyright owners, Apollo would reap millions in profits 
that would otherwise be diminished through the payment of royalties to 
represented, on any stage or public place during the whole period for which the copy-
right is obtained. 
106. An Act supplemental to an act entitled: An act to amend the several acts respecting
copyright, approved February third, eighteen hundred and thirty-one, and to the acts in addition 
thereto and amendment thereof. (March 3, 1865): 
Be it enacted ‘by The Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of Amer-
ica in Congress assembled, That the provisions of said act shall extend to and include 
photographs and the negatives thereof which shall hereafter be made, and shall enure to 
the benefit of the’ authors of the same in the same manner, and to the same extent, and. 
upon the same conditions as to the authors of prints and engravings. 
107. An Act to amend sections five, eleven, and twenty-five of an Act entitled “An Act to
amend and consolidate the Acts respecting copyright,” approved March fourth, nineteen hundred 
and nine (Aug. 24, 1912). 
108. 209 U.S. 1. 
109. 17 U.S.C. § 102. 
110. Copyright Act of 1909, Sec. 4 (March 4, 1909) (“[t]hat the works for which copyright
may be secured under this Act shall include all the writings of an author.”). 
111. White-Smith, 209 U.S. at 8-9. Player pianos rolls were 
perforated sheets, which are passed over ducts connected with the operating parts of the
[player piano] mechanism in such manner that the same are kept sealed until, by means
of perforations in the rolls, air pressure is admitted to the ducts which operate the pneu-
matic devices to sound the notes. . . . As the roll is drawn over the tracker board the notes 
are sounded as the perforations admit the atmospheric pressure, the perforations having
been so arranged that the effect is to produce the melody or tune for which the roll has
been cut. 
112. Id. at 9. 
113. Id.
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the copyright owners. The Court held that the player piano rolls did not 
constitute “copies” of the musical composition, and therefore Apollo 
was not infringing. The Court looked to define what was meant by a 
“copy”114 and whether the player piano rolls met that definition. Justice 
Day, writing for a unanimous court, held that they did not.115 Justice Day 
noted Congress chose to protect some creative expressions and not 
others, supported the argument that certain forms of unauthorized 
copying have historically been permitted, and only when specified by 
statute are forms of expression protected.116 The Court concluded that, 
“[a]s the act of Congress now stands we believe it does not include these 
records as copies or publications of the copyrighted music involved in 
these cases.”117 In answering the question of what constituted a copy, the 
Court noted several cases which held that copying required duplication 
of the original; sheet music was not equivalent to a piano roll that 
required a machine to reproduce the music, and could not be perceived 
with the human eye.118
114. Id. at 17. 
115. Id. Justice Day defined “a copy of a musical composition to be ‘a written or printed
record of it in intelligible notation.’” Id. In holding that the player piano rolls were not “copies,” he 
reasoned that 
It may be true that in a broad sense a mechanical instrument which reproduces a tune 
copies it; but this is a strained and artificial meaning. When the combination of musical 
sounds is reproduced to the ear it is the original tune as conceived by the author which is 
heard. These musical tones are not a copy which appeals to the eye. In no sense can mu-
sical sounds which reach us through the sense of hearing be said to be copies, as that 
term is generally understood, and as we believe it was intended to be understood in the 
statutes under consideration. A musical composition is an intellectual creation which 
first exists in the mind of the composer; he may play it for the first time upon an instru-
ment. It is not susceptible of being copied until it has been put in a form which others 
can see and read. The statute has not provided for the protection of the intellectual con-
ception apart from the thing produced, however meritorious such conception may be, but 
has provided for the making and filing of a tangible thing, against the publication and 
duplication of which it is the purpose of the statute to protect the composer. 
116. Id. at 18 (“It may be true that the use of these perforated rolls, in the absence of statutory
protection, enables manufacturers thereof to enjoy the use of musical compositions for which they 
pay no value. But such considerations properly address themselves to the legislative, and not to the 
judicial, branch of government.”). 
117. Id.
118. Among many examples cited by the White-Smith Court is Boosey v. Whight [1899] 1
Ch. 836, 80 L. T. N. S. 561:  
‘The defendants have taken those sheets of music and have prepared from them sheets of 
paper with perforations in them, and these perforated sheets, when put into and used with 
properly constructed machines or instruments, will produce or enable the machines or in-
struments to produce the music indicated on the plaintiffs’ sheets. . . . But is this the kind 
of copying which is prohibited by the copyright act; or rather, is the perforated sheet, 
made as above mentioned, a copy of the sheet of music from which it is made? Is it a 
copy at all? Is it a copy within [the meaning of] the copyright act? A sheet of music is 
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While Congress amended the Copyright Act to include these works 
under its purview,119 the Court continued to confine copies of musical 
works under the Act to those specific mediums of expression defined by 
Congress.120 This history of rationing what fell within the definition of 
copyrightable subject matter resulted in a larger reach of legal copying 
and consequently a smaller cohort of who was an intended infringer. 
5. The Non-Commercial Elements of Fair Use
Congress bases some of its choices regarding what deserves
protection under the Copyright Act on socioeconomic considerations and 
the general purpose of the Constitution’s patent and copyright clause.121
Illustrative of this are the economic and commercial analyses in two of 
the four elements of a fair use determination. As previously noted,122 the 
fair use defense “exempts from liability certain modest uses of 
copyrighted work when those uses do not undermine the economic 
interests of the copyright owner.”123 It “is a privilege in others than the 
owner of a copyright to use the copyrighted material in a reasonable 
treated in the copyright act as if it were a book or sheet of letter press. Any mode of cop-
ying such a thing, whether by printing, writing, photography, or by some other method 
not yet invented, would no doubt be copying. So, perhaps, might a perforated sheet of 
paper to be sung or played from in the same way as sheets of music are sung or played 
from. But to play an instrument from a sheet of music which appears to the eye is one 
thing; to play an instrument with a perforated sheet which itself forms part of the mecha-
nism which produces the music is quite another thing.’  
White-Smith, 209 U.S. at 13-14 (citing Boosey v. Whight [1899] 1 Ch. 836, 80 L. T. N. S. 561). 
119. An Act to amend sections five, eleven, and twenty-five of an Act entitled “An Act to
amend and consolidate the Acts respecting copyright,” approved March fourth, nineteen hundred 
and nine (Aug. 24,1912): 
Whenever the owner of a musical copyright has used or permitted the use of the copy-
righted work upon the parts of musical instruments serving to reproduce mechanically 
the musical work, then in case of infringement of such copyright by the unauthorized 
manufacture, use, or sale of interchangeable parts, such as disks, rolls, bands, or cylin-
ders for use in mechanical music-producing machines adapted to reproduce the copy-
righted music . . in a civil action an injunction may be granted upon such terms as the 
court may impose, and the plaintiff shall be entitled to recover in lieu of profits and dam-
ages a royalty as provided ‘in section one, subsection (e), of this Act. 
Section 25(e). 
120. White-Smith, 209 U.S at 16 (“When we turn to the consideration of the act it seems
evident that Congress has dealt with the tangible thing, a copy of which is required to be filed with 
the Librarian of Congress, and wherever the words are used (copy or copies) they seem to refer to 
the term in its ordinary sense of indicating reproduction or duplication of the original.”).  
121. U.S. CONST art. I, § 8., cl. 8. (“To promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by
securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings 
and Discoveries.”). 
122. See supra note 25 and accompanying text.
123. SCHECHTER & THOMAS, supra note 25, at 432. 
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manner without his consent, notwithstanding the monopoly granted to 
the owner.”124
The first Fair Use element looks to the nature of the allegedly 
infringing work, including “the purpose and character of the use, 
including whether such use is of a commercial nature or is for nonprofit 
educational purposes.”125 The Supreme Court regularly emphasizes this 
commercial attribute as a factor against Fair Use (and thus toward 
infringement liability) in several decisions, including Harper & Row 
Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enterprises,126 where it cites to its earlier 
decision in Sony Corporation of America v. Universal City Studios:127
[E]very commercial use of copyrighted material is presumptively an
unfair exploitation of the monopoly privilege that belongs to the owner
of the copyright. . . . The crux of the profit/nonprofit distinction is not
whether the sole motive of the use is monetary gain but whether the
user stands to profit from exploitation of the copyrighted material
without paying the customary price.128
The commercial nature of the infringement is again at issue in Campbell 
v. Acuff-Rose Music,129 where the Court weighed the transformativeness
of a parody against the commercial nature of a song, holding: “the more
transformative the new work, the less will be the significance of other
factors, like commercialism, that may weigh against a finding of fair
use.”130 The Supreme Court noted that it is a balancing act with regard to
how a copyrighted work is used and transformed and its commercial or
non-commercial nature. Thus, under the current Act, while it is not
dispositive,131 lack of commercialization is a factor to be heavily
124. Rosemont Enter., Inc. v. Random House, Inc., 366 F.2d 303, 306 (2d Cir. 1966): 
The fundamental justification for the privilege lies in the constitutional purpose in grant-
ing copyright protection in the first instance, to wit, ‘To Promote the Progress of Science 
and the Useful Arts.’ To serve that purpose, courts in passing upon particular claims of
infringement must occasionally subordinate the copyright holder’s interest in a maxi-
mum financial return to the greater public interest in the development of art, science and
industry.
Id. at 307 (internal citations and quotations omitted). 
125. 17 U.S.C. § 107(1). 
126. 471 U.S. 539 (1985). 
127. 464 U.S. 417, 451 (1984). 
128. Harper & Row, 471 U.S. at 562, citing Sony Corp. of Am., 464 U.S. at 451; Roy Export
Co. Establishment of Vaduz v. Columbia Broad. Sys., Inc., 503 F. Supp. 1137, 1144 (S.D.N.Y. Dec 
17, 1980); 3 Nimmer § 13.05[A][1], at 13–71, n. 25.3. 
129. 510 U.S. 569 (1994) 
130. Id. at 579. 
131. Id. at 584 (“the mere fact that a use is educational and not for profit does not insulate it
from a finding of infringement, any more than the commercial character of a use bars a finding of 
fairness.”). 
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considered when applying the Fair Use exception of Section 107.132
The fourth Fair Use factor also has a commercial element. It 
examines “the effect of the use upon the potential market for or value of 
the copyrighted work.”133 In Random House, the Supreme Court 
considered this factor “undoubtedly the single most important element of 
fair use. Fair use, when properly applied, is limited to copying by others 
which does not materially impair the marketability of the work which is 
copied.”134
Thus, the intended infringer in 1976 was in many ways considered 
to be someone who caused serious harm to the economic interests of the 
copyright owner, as illustrated in the first and fourth elements of the Fair 
Use defense of Section 107: whether the defendant’s use is commercial 
in nature and whether that use will affect the market for the original.135
6. Beyond Copyright: Noncommercial Patent & Trademark
Exemptions
Historically, the private creative experimenter136 and the personal 
user137 were, for the most part, given a “pass” on infringement liability. 
Under patent law’s “experimental use” exception, “[i]t has been held, 
and no doubt is now well settled, that an experiment with a patented 
article for the sole purpose of gratifying a philosophical taste, or 
curiosity, or for mere amusement, is not an infringement of the rights of 
132. 17 U.S.C. §107. 
133. § 107(4). 
134. Harper & Row, 471 U.S. at 566–67, quoting 3 Nimmer § 13.05[A] at 13–76 and 1
Nimmer § 1.10[D] at 1–87 (internal quotations omitted); see also Sony Corp. of Am., 464 U.S. at 
451 (“What is necessary is a showing by a preponderance of the evidence that some meaningful 
likelihood of future harm exists. If the intended use is for commercial gain, that likelihood may be 
presumed. But if it is for a noncommercial purpose, the likelihood must be demonstrated.”). 
135. 17 U.S.C. § 107(4) (“. . . the effect of the use upon the potential market for or value of the 
copyrighted work.”); Campbell, 510 U.S. at 571 (“The fourth factor requires courts also to consider 
the potential market for derivative works.”). 
136. Whitmore v. Cutter, 1 Gall. 429 (1813) (“[I]t could never have been the intention of the
legislature to punish a man, who constructed such a machine merely for philosophical experiments, 
or for the purpose of ascertaining the sufficiency of the machine to produce its described effects.”).  
137. See 1 Callmann on Unfair Comp., Tr. & Mono. § 2.9 (4th Ed.) (“[N]either § 32 of the
Lanham Act (infringement of a registered mark) nor § 43 (any false designation of origin) applies 
unless the defendant’s use of the plaintiff’s mark is done in a commercial context.”) (citing
Obolensky v. G.P. Putnam’s Sons, 628 F. Supp. 1552 (S.D.N.Y. 1986), decision aff’d, 795 F.2d 
1005 (2d Cir. 1986) (“A false designation of origin by itself is not enough; the requirement that the 
defendant cause the goods in question to enter into commerce is an additional jurisdictional 
requirement, apart from the interstate nature thereof.”) (emphasis in the original)); Cognotec 
Services, Ltd.. v. Morgan Guar. Trust Co of NY, 862 F. Supp. 45 (S.D.N.Y. 1994); Charles Greiner 
& Co., Inc. v. Mari-Med Mfg., Inc., 754 F. Supp. 951 (D.R.I. 1991); Hunn v. Dan Wilson Homes, 
Inc., 789 F.3d 573 (5th Cir. 2015). 
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the patentee.”138 To establish a prima facie case under the Lanham Act, 
the plaintiff must demonstrate that the defendant was using the mark “in 
commerce.”139  The intended infringers under these regimes were never 
meant to include individuals who were acting within the privacy of their 
homes. The private individual could quietly experiment on a patented 
article, or create works for her private consumption or for a non-
commercial endeavor. Crossing the line into commercialism and public 
exposure, however, is what opened her up to liability. Many pre-Internet 
cases of trademark infringement went unnoticed; the decision to 
advertise one’s wares in cyberspace, however, increases the risk of 
infringement actions to such individuals. 
The enterprise of a young man, who we will call “James,”140 is one 
example of this phenomenon. James attended Northeastern University 
(NU); he, along with his buddies, came up with the “great” idea of 
creating T-shirts with sayings such as “Just NU it” and “NUMA,”141
playing off of the Nike and PUMA slogan designs and logos and using 
marks and creative expressions that these athletic apparel companies use 
for their products (Figure 1).142
138. Poppenhusen v. Falke, 19 F. Cas. 1048, 1049 (S.D.N.Y. 1861). 
139. Trademark infringement liability requires the defendant to be using the plaintiff’s mark
“in commerce.” See 15 U.S.C. § 1114(1)(a) [§ 32(1)(a)] (“Any person who shall, without the 
consent of the registrant use in commerce any reproduction, counterfeit, copy, or colorable imitation 
of a registered mark in connection with the sale, offering for sale, distribution, or advertising of any 
goods or services on or in connection with which such use is likely to cause confusion, or cause 
mistake or to deceive . . . shall be liable in a civil action by the registrant . . . .”) (emphasis added). 
See also Rescuecom Corp. v. Google, Inc., 562 F.3d 123, 128 (2d Cir. 2009) (“Sections 32 and 43 
of the [Lanham] Act . . . impose liability for unpermitted ‘use in commerce’ of another’s mark 
which is ‘likely to cause confusion, or to cause mistake, or two deceive as to the affiliation . . . or as 
to the origin, sponsorship or approval of his or her goods [or] services . . . by another person.”) 
(internal citations omitted). 
140. Not his real name.
141. Letter from Nike to “James” on file with author. With regard to copyright, this activity
was more than just non-creative copying and entered the realm of artistic appropriation, but not by 
much. 
142. The owners of PUMA were not a party.
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Figure 1 
If James and his friends had merely made these shirts and wore 
them around campus, they would not have been using Nike’s mark “in 
commerce,”143 and would not be infringing on Nike’s mark. If they had 
quietly sold their shirts on campus, even though they would have been 
infringing on Nike’s mark, Nike would likely never notice it. One can 
easily imagine such a pre-internet scenario (or if the shirts were not 
advertised on a website), where James and his friends made the shirts, 
sold them, and Nike would remain blissfully unaware of their enterprise. 
James and his buddies had other plans in mind, however, and decided to 
sell these shirts to other Northeastern undergrads. And they had a 
website.144 It did not take long for Nike’s army of people who look for 
these infringing actions to find them and tell the young men to stop.145
143. 1-800Contacts, Inc. v. WhenU.com, Inc. 414 F.3d 400, 407 (2d Cir. 2005) (holding that
showing “use in commerce” by the defendant is an essential element in establishing a trademark 
infringement claim). 
144. Documented in Nike Letter.
145. Nike was quite kind in their letter, stating that while Nike appreciated their
“entrepreneurial efforts and goal of increasing school spirit . . . [their] use of ‘JUST NU IT, 
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The young men might try to claim that their t-shirts fell within the 
trademark parody “fair use”146 exception as a play-on-words, and in all 
likelihood would not succeed. Under Rogers v. Grimaldi,147 “the 
landmark case for balancing trademark and first amendment rights,” the 
Second Circuit held “that in general the [Lanham] Act should be 
construed to apply to artistic works only where the public interest in 
avoiding consumer confusion outweighs the public interest in free 
expression.”148
In Harley Davidson, Inc. v. Grottanelli,149 the Second Circuit again 
faced the issue of parodies in logos. Ronald Grottanelli owned a repair 
shop called The Hog Farm where he fixed Harley-Davidson 
motorcycles. Grottanelli used hand-drawn variations of Harley–
Davidson’s bar-and-shield logo in his business advertisements;150
Harley-Davidson sought to enjoin Grottanelli from using the logo.151
The court granted Harley-Davidson an injunction, holding that a 
defendant’s mark which makes no comment on the plaintiff’s mark is 
infringing because the defendant “simply uses it somewhat humorously 
to promote his own products and services, which is not a permitted 
trademark parody.”152
especially along with the font and color scheme [used] . . . will likely confuse customers into 
believing that [NUde Wear’s] products come from or are authorized by Nike.” Nike asked that the 
men cease using the slogan but was “willing to allow [NUde Wear] to sell through any existing 
inventory, provided that [Nike] receive . . . written confirmation that there will be no further use of 
‘JUST NU IT.’” Nike did not have to do this—under the Lanham Act, Nike was entitled to all 
profits and require that the remaining shirts be destroyed. Under Sections 35 and 36 of the Lanham 
Act (15 U.S.C. § 1117 & 1118), Nike was entitled to seek NUde Wear’s profits, any damages 
sustained by Nike and court costs, and could seek the destruction of the infringing articles. § 
1117(a), § 1118. 
146. Harley-Davidson, Inc. v. Grottanelli, 164 F.3d 806, 813 (2d Cir. 1999). 
147. 875 F.2d 994 (2d Cir 1989). 
148. Id. at 999. 
149. 164 F.3d 806. 
150. Id. at 808-809. 
151. Harley Davidson also sought an injunction over the word “hog” but was denied by the
Second Circuit, which held that it was a generic term for motorcycles. Id. at 811. 
152. Id. at 813; see also Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 569–70 (1994)
(“The heart of any parodist’s claim to quote from existing material is the use of some elements of a 
prior author’s composition to create a new one that, at least in part, comments on that author’s 
work.”). The Supreme Court’s copyright parody/satire distinction made in Campbell has been 
borrowed by courts in trademark infringement analysis. Juli Wilson Marshall & Nicholas J. 
Siciliano, The Satire/Parody Distinction in Copyright and Trademark Law—Can Satire Ever be a 
Fair Use?, ABA SECTION OF LITIGATION, IP LITIGATION COMMITTEE, 
https://apps.americanbar.org/litigation/committees/intellectual/roundtables/0506_outline.pdf (last 
visited May 1, 2017) (citing to Harley Davidson Inc. v. Grottanelli, 164 F.3d 806 (2d Cir. 1999); 
Elvis Presley Enters., Inc. v. Capese, 141 F.3d 188 (5th Cir. 1998); Tommy Hilfiger Licensing, Inc., 
v. Nature Labs, LLC, 221 F. Supp. 2d 410 (S.D.N.Y. 2002)). The ABA Section also notes that other 
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Grottanelli’s conflict with Harley Davidson occurred in the early 
days of the Internet. The exponential growth of the worldwide web has 
made it easier for rights owners to uncover those previously overlooked 
small-scale bootlegger/pirate/trademark/patent infringers, who can now 
be found and held liable. And as will be discussed next, even copying 
done for personal use now blurs the line and detrimentally affects the 
copyright owner’s market for her expression: that boundary needs to be 
examined to determine where a new line should be drawn between 
infringers and non-infringers, and if a change in the current “one size fits 
all” statutory damages remedy for infringement is appropriate. 
III. CAPTURING INTENDED AND UNINTENDED INFRINGERS
As discussed supra, in the past, lack of resources limited infringers 
to those with sufficient means to copy inventions and creative works—
the gatekeeper system effectively controlled the system.153 While there 
were disadvantages to the gatekeeper system,154 it did, for the most part, 
effectively prevent free-riding155 on the inventive and creative skills of 
others. The technology at the time of its enactment did not provide the 
intellectual property owners the ability to find infringers, and it was not 
economically feasible to pursue these people. 
A. Newly Captured Infringers
As previously stated, technological advancements in copying have
led to the ability to both more easily infringe and more easily be caught. 
This section will first discuss newly-created infringers: small-scale 
courts have applied a nominative fair use test to determine whether parody is a successful defense. 
153. See, e.g., Perritt, Jr., supra note 38, at 74-75 (“Record labels were the initial gatekeepers,
although radio stations were gatekeepers for building a fan base. An aspiring star would first get a 
record deal with a local label and, if things went well, eventually graduate to a major label with a 
national market presence.”). 
154. Gatekeepers limited the music to which the public was exposed based on the record
producer’s own tastes and proclivities, which meant that many musical tastes could be 
underrepresented in what was recorded and broadcast. Paul Rogers, A&R Star Markers: The 
Vanishing Gatekeepers, LAWEEKLY (Feb. 11, 2010), http://www.laweekly.com/music/aandr-star-
makers-the-vanishing-gatekeepers-2163762. But c.f. Perritt, Jr., supra note 38, at 72 (“[M]usicians 
had no prayer of making a record unless he hooked up with a recording studio. Elvis hung out for 
weeks before he made such a pest of himself that Sun Records’ Sam Phillips finally agreed to talk to 
him.”). 
155. Free-riding is an economics term used to describe a situation where people benefit from
the use of good or services without paying for them, leading to scarcity of the goods or services or 
disincentives for people to create or provide the goods/services. Freeriding, INVESTOPEDIA, 
http://www.investopedia.com/terms/f/freeriding.asp?ad=dirN&qo=investopediaSiteSearch&qsrc=0
&o=40186 (last visited Mar. 5, 2017). 
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commercial infringers who, in the past, did not have the resources to 
have a successful bootlegging/pirating enterprise. A newly-discovered 
type of infringer will then be discussed: noncommercial personal copiers 
who copy for the purpose of media shifting.156 Finally, there is a 
discussion of where personal infringers who download songs from the 
internet fit in the intended/unintended infringer paradigm. 
1. Small-Scale Commercial Infringers
As previously discussed, for the most part, prior to the age of digital
copying, there were two categories of non-creative infringers pursued by 
copyright owners: the person who made an unauthorized copy for 
personal use and the mass producer. The personal user, for the most part, 
lacked the sophisticated equipment to make a fast, high quality copy, 
and was not a target who was easily discovered,157 while the mass 
producer was the intended defendant of infringement actions.158 With the 
digitized revolution, a new player emerged—the small-scale commercial 
infringer. Professor Henry H. Perritt, Jr., described this evolution and its 
implications for the recording industry, which began in the late 1990s,159
although the effects were felt most dramatically after the turn of the 
century. The wide availability of inexpensive portable music players, 
the introduction of digital formats and compression software pre-
installed on almost every personal computer, and the ubiquity of the 
Internet destroyed the control exercised by traditional gatekeepers and 
made intellectual property in recorded music essentially unenforceable. 
As distribution channels shifted dramatically to downloadable formats 
delivered through the Internet, new kinds of search engine technolo-
gies challenged broadcast radio’s preeminence.160
The ability to make small-scale copies for small-scale 
distribution—and be caught—affects all three forms of intellectual 
property. For copyright, this can take the form of both small-scale non-
creative copying, as well as alteration and appropriation of a well-known 
logo for commercial advantage, such as when Ronald Grottanelli 
appropriated the Harley Davidson logo. The explosive growth of easy 
infringement increases the “policing” costs for the copyright and 
trademark owner, as there are more players to catch, but exposure of the 
156. See generally Jessica Litman, Lawful Personal Use, 85 TEX. L. REV. 1871 (2007). 
157. See supra Section II.A.3.
158. See supra Section II.A.2.
159. Perritt, Jr., supra note 38, at 74–75 (2011). 
160. Id.
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infringing works on the internet increases the ease of finding them. 
2. Noncommercial Personal Copying
Like many people of my generation, I have a large collection of
compact discs161 containing my favorite music. But now I have an mp3 
player and wish to have that music loaded onto that device. Should my 
copying from the CD onto my mp3 player be considered infringement 
because I have made an unauthorized reproduction of those songs? 
Would requiring me to repurchase a song I already own amount to rent 
seeking by the copyright owner? Professor Jessica Litman tackled this 
issue of lawful personal use, focusing on the argument that without an 
audience, copyright has no meaning, and thus users’ and consumers’ 
rights should be at the center of our copyright system.162 Rather than 
reargue her points and re-illustrate her many examples whereby the 
courts have upheld the legality of noncommercial personal use,163 this 
author supports Professor Litman’s contention that personal 
noncommercial use, even in creating a derivative work in the privacy of 
one’s own home, is a legal use of the copyrighted work. This author 
goes further, in support of her own argument, that these personal users, 
even if they may now be discovered and located, are not intended 
infringers. The new ability to find these individuals does not support the 
historical design of copyright that such use is a legal, non-infringing use. 
Congress hinted at its reluctance to create an infringement action 
for noncommercial copying in an early draft of the Audio Home 
Recording Act (AHRA) of 1992.164 The Senate Report for the AHRA of 
1991 was clear in drawing the line between noncommercial personal 
copying165 and copying for direct or indirect commercial gain.166 While 
161. I also have a large collection of vinyl records.
162. Litman, supra note 156, at 1878. 
163. Among other examples, Professor Litman notes Lewis Galoob Toys, Inc., v. Nintendo of
Am., Inc., 780 F. Supp. 1283 (N.D. Cal 1991), aff’d, 964 F.2d 965 (9th Cir. 1992) (holding that in 
the case of a software program that allowed “consumers to create unauthorized derivative works by 
varying the Nintendo games’ audiovisual display . . . the alleged infringer . . . [was] not a 
commercial licensee, but rather a consumer utilizing the Game Genie for noncommercial personal 
enjoyment.”). Litman, supra note 156, at 1889-90 (internal quotations omitted). 
164. S. Rep. 102-294, 51 (“[A] key purpose of S. 1623 is to insure the right of consumers to
make analog or digital audio recordings of copyrighted music for private noncommercial use.”). 
165. Id. (“Section 1002(a)(2) states that the copying of an audiogram by a consumer for 
private, noncommercial use is not for direct or indirect commercial advantage and is therefore not 
actionable.”). 
166. Id. (“Protection against copyright infringement actions does not extend to infringement
claims by virtue of the making of one or more audiograms, or other material objects in which works 
are fixed, for direct or indirect commercial advantage.”). 
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“the making of an audiogram by a consumer for use in his or her home, 
car, or portable tape player, or for a family member, is protected by the 
prohibition against copyright infringement actions”167 in Section 1002168
and 1003,169 copying for a commercial advantage is actionable. The 
language of Section 1003 was altered and renumbered as Section 1008, 
and gives slightly more ambiguous protection: 
No action may be brought under this title alleging infringement of 
copyright based on . . . the noncommercial use by a consumer of [a 
digital audio recording device, a digital audio recording medium, an 
analog recording device, or an analog recording medium] for making 
digital musical recordings or analog musical recordings.170
To Congress, the intended infringer was “a person who makes multiple 
copies of a particular audiogram and sells those copies to others [and] 
would not be protected by the prohibition against copyright 
infringements actions”171 afforded to noncommercial copiers under the 
AHRA. 
In his 2009 article, Robert Masterson makes the argument that such 
copying is a noninfringing use based on several arguments. First, he 
claims that for obsolete musical media, the owner of a particular copy 
has “the right of an owner to maintain a piece of property as fit for its 
intended purpose,”172 as well as other “limitations of a copyright 
owner’s rights in copyright law,” and “the right of maintaining a piece of 
property as fit for its intended purpose.”173  Masterson also relies on the 
Sound Recording Act legislative history174 (noting that Justice Stevens 
167. Id. An audiogram is defined in the draft AHRA in S. Rep. 102-294 as “a material object
(i) which are fixed, by any method now known or later developed, only sounds (and not, for
example, a motion picture or other audiovisual work even though it may be accompanied by
sounds), and material, statements or instructions incidental to those fixed sounds, if any, and (ii)
from which the sounds and material can be perceived, reproduced, or otherwise communicated,
either directly or with the aid of a machine or device.” The “audiogram” was renamed a “digital 
audio copied recording” in the enacted AHRA, defined as “a reproduction in a digital recording
format of a digital musical recording, whether that reproduction is made directly from another
digital musical recording or indirectly from a transmission.” 
168. S. Rep. 102-294 § 1002(a)(2) (“Example.- For the purposes of this section, the copying of 
an audiogram by a consumer for private, noncommercial use is not for direct or indirect commercial 
advantage, and is therefore not actionable.”). 
169. S. Rep. 102-294 § 1003. 
170. 17 U.S.C. § 1008. 
171. S. Rep. 102-294, 51-52. 
172. Robert L. Masterson, Converting Obsolete Musical Media to Current Formats: A
Copyright Infringement Defense Arising from the Right to Repair and Implied Warranty of Fitness, 
82 TEMPLE L. REV. 281, 282 (2009). 
173. Id. at 296.
174. Id. at 289 (“[T]he legislative history of the Sound Recording Amendment explicitly
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did so when he authored Sony Corp. of America v. Universal City 
Studios175) in supporting his argument that personal, noncommercial 
copying of sound recordings is not an infringement.176
RIAA and other copyright owners focused litigation on 
manufacturers such as Sony177 and Diamond Multimedia178 because the 
people using these devices are unlikely to be discovered. As discussed 
previously, however, there are strong arguments that even if such 
defendants were to be found, they should not be liable.179 When faced 
with an alleged charge of infringement from a copyright owner, these 
individuals would most likely pay for a license rather than face the 
possibility of a large damages remedy should they choose to fight in 
court. Rather than allow copyright owners to rent seek from these 
individuals or rely on the courts to continue pushing back against this 
abuse, Congress should amend the Copyright Act to reassure the long-
held principle that individuals who engage in media shifting for 
noncommercial use are not intended infringers, and are exempt from 
liability under the Act. Media shifting copying for personal use was 
meant to be “protected by the prohibition against copyright infringement 
actions;”180 to include this group as one with infringement liability 
would be contrary to whom Congress considers an intended infringer. 
The Court in Sony infers that a viewer has a right to personal, 
noncommercial use through time shifting—whereby the viewer records a 
broadcast that she legally has the right to view. The person making the 
recording is merely choosing to view the performance at a time of her 
own convenience,181 thus making a copy for a lawful personal use long 
recognized by the courts182 as a form of media shifting—from no 
stated that Congress did not intend to “restrain the home recording . . . form tapes or records . . . for 
private use.”) (citing H.R. Rep. No. 92-487, at 5 (1971), reprinted in 1971 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1566, 
1572).  
175. Id. at 290 (citing Peter Menell & David Nimmer, Unwinding Sony, 95 CAL. L. REV. 941,
965-66 (2007)). 
176. Id. at 289-90. 
177. See Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417 (1984). 
178. RIAA v. Diamond Multimedia Sys., Inc., 180 F.3d 1072 (9th Cir. 1999). 
179. See supra Section IV.A.2.
180. AHRA § 1003. 
181. Sony, 464 U.S. at 454-55 (concluding that there was ample evidence on the record to
support “the District Court’s conclusion that home time-shifting is fair use.”). 
182. Litman, supra note 156, at 1889. Professor Litman observes that in decisions such as
Stowe v. Thomas, 23 F. Cas. 201 (C.C.E.D. Pa. 1853) (No. 13,513), White-Smith Music Publ’g Co. 
v. Apollo Co., 209 U.S. 1 (1908), and Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S.
417 (1984), the courts continually upheld the rights of readers, listeners, and viewers, respectively.
Id. (citing to Williams & Wilkins v. United States, 487 F.2d 1345 (Ct. Cl. 1973), aff’d by an equally 
divided Court, 420 U.S. 376 (1975)). 
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medium to some form of media.183
This right to control how we personally desire to view and listen to 
content for which we have the right to listen/view is currently at issue 
with regard to the “cable box” proposed regulations.184 Currently, cable 
and satellite companies have moved towards a model whereby not only 
do they charge a fee for the content they provide to consumers, but then, 
in order to actually view the content, the consumer is required to rent 
devices from the cable and satellite providers to descramble the 
signal.185 Essentially, the cable and satellite companies are controlling 
access to the content twice. The Federal Communications Commission 
has sought to enact a rule that would end this rent-seeking.186 Under the 
proposed rule—which has faced strong opposition from cable 
providers—the monopoly on “navigation devices”187 would require that: 
any device on which a multichannel video programming distributor 
makes available an application to access multichannel video program-
ming, must support at least one Compliant Security System that offers 
access to the same Navigable Services with the same rights to use 
those Navigable Services as the multichannel video programming dis-
tributor affords to its own application.” 188
The distributor would also be prohibited from impeding the reception 
183. Among Litman’s examples that the courts infer that “copyright law has always excused
strictly personal copying,” she cites Recording Industry Association of America v. Diamond 
Multimedia Systems, Inc., where the Ninth Circuit held that a person who transferred a song onto his 
MP3 player was merely rendering “portable, or space shift[ing] those files that already reside on a 
user’s hard drive. . . . Such copyright is paradigmatic noncommercial personal use entirely 
consistent with the purposes of the Act.” Id. at 1892, citing Recording Indus. Ass’n Of Am., v. 
Diamond Multimedia Sys., Inc., 180 F.3d 1072, 1079 (9th Cir. 1999). 
184. Cable companies are currently fighting the loss of their monopoly over set-top boxes
necessary to access cable television content. See FR Vol. 81, No. 51, 14033. (“[W]e propose new 
rules to empower consumers to choose how they wish to access the multichannel video 
programming to which they subscribe, and promote innovation in the display, selection, and use of 
this programming and of other video programming available to consumers . . . to assure a 
commercial market for devices that can access multichannel video programming . . . . We proposed 
rules intended to allow consumer electronics manufacturers, innovators, and other developers to 
build devices or software solutions that can navigate the universe of multichannel video 
programming with a competitive user interface.”). 
185. Annemarie Bridy, Unlock The Box Meets Lochner, THE CENTER FOR INTERNET AND
SOCIETY (Aug. 4, 2016), http://cyberlaw.stanford.edu/blog/2016/08/unlock-box-meets-lochner.  
186. Unfortunately, the FCC has delayed its final vote on this Rule. Cecilia Kang, Vote is
Delayed on a Plan to Let People Pick Their Cable Box, NY TIMES B2 (Sept. 30, 2016).  
187. Navigation devises are defined under the proposed rules as “[d]evices such as converter
boxers, interactive communications equipment, and other equipment used by consumers to access 
multichannel video programming and other services offered over multichannel video programming 
systems.” Federal Register, Vol. 81, No. 51 § 76.1200(j) 14051 (March 16, 2016). 
188. FR 14052, § 76.1211(d) (Mar. 16, 2016). 
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and use of others’ devices through a slow-down of service or other 
method.189
Currently, content providers are limiting access to copyrighted 
works which one has already paid to view,190 which goes beyond the 
rights enumerated under the Copyright Act.191 Copyright owners do not 
have plenary rights over their works.192 Extending these rights via a 
189. § 76.1211(c): 
Each multichannel video programming distributor shall support at least one Compliant
Security System.
(1) At least one supported Compliant Security System shall enable access to all resolu-
tions and formats of the multichannel video programming distributor’s Navigable Ser-
vices with the same Entitlement Data to use those Navigable Services as the multichan-
nel video programming distributor affords Navigation Devices that it leases, sells, or
otherwise provides to its subscribers. 
(2) Entitlement Data shall not discriminate on the basis of the affiliation of the Naviga-
tion Device.
190. As explained by Professor Lemley,
The studios have already been paid for the movies shown on a cable or satellite service.
Indeed, they’ve been paid specifically for the right to publicly perform the work by
transmitting it to my (and everyone else’s) home.
And here, copyright law says something very important to copyright owners: that’s all
you get. Once the cable companies have paid the MPAA for the right to deliver their
movie into my home, the MPAA loses control over how I choose to watch their movie in 
the privacy of my home. . . most importantly, I can swatch it on any device I want, in-
cluding my computer, my iPad, or my phone. 
Mark Lemley, Don’t Let Copyright Box Us In, THE HILL (Sept. 21, 2016), 
http://thehill.com/blogs/congress-blog/technology/297059-dont-let-copyright-box-us-in. 
191. 17 U.S.C. § 106; see also Federal Communications Commission, Reply Comments of
Copyright Law Scholars and the Electric Frontier Foundation, In the Matter of Expanding 
Customers’ Video Navigation Choices (May 23, 2016), https://ecfsapi.fcc.gov/
file/60002014169.pdf (“when one uses copyright works in ways that fall outside the exclusive rights 
of the rightsholder, nothing in the law compels the user to comply with additional terms or 
restrictions that the rightsholder seeks to impose”); see also Lemley, supra note 190 (“Copyright 
gives its owner the right to control the making of copies and public performances of a work. But it 
does not give them control over any use of a work. That is no accident. Once the copyright owner 
has been paid once for a particular copy, its control over that copy ends. This is why I can lend a 
book to friends, or sell my used record collection outright. . . . [T]here are some things I can’t do 
even with a copy of a movie or sing that I own. I can’t upload it onto a file-sharing site, . . . and I 
can’t play it on the radio. But that’s because doing those things either makes a new copy or makes a 
new, public performance of the work.”); see also Sony Pictures, Inc. v. Universal Studios, Inc., 464 
U.S. 417, 447 (1984) (“Even unauthorized uses of a copyrighted work are not necessarily 
infringing. An unlicensed use of the copyright is not an infringement unless it conflicts with one of 
the specific exclusive rights conferred by the copyright statute.”); see also Bridy, supra note 185 
(“[T]here is no general ‘right to manage the exploitation of a copyrighted work’ under federal 
copyright law. Rather, the five rights specifically enumerated in Section 106, and those five rights 
alone, define the extent of copyright entitlement. It is true that rights holders are generally free to 
strike bargains in the commercial marketplace that give them broader control over the disposition of 
their protected works than the Copyright Act affords. Those deals, however are private law bargains 
that are legitimately subject to regulatory limits.”). 
192. Sony Corp., 464 U.S. at 432–33 (1984) (affirming that “[c]opyright protection . . . has 
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contract of adhesion which ties copyright rights to the rental of a device 
in order to view the already lawfully-purchased content is an attempt to 
extend copyright rights outside of those enumerated in the statute.193 The 
FCC is thus attempting to use its regulatory authority to end this affront 
to lawful personal use. 
3. Personal Infringers
Unlike making media-shifting copies of copyrighted works that one
already lawfully owns, unlawfully obtaining a copy of a song that one 
does not currently own via an internet download or other method is 
likely to always incur infringement liability. It is also likely to be the 
kind that Congress and the courts would consider to be an intended 
infringer to be retained in the infringement net. 
The internet has made it easy to find songs to download, and until 
the music industry changed its model to make it efficient to only 
download the songs an individual wanted, many infringers were those 
who were looking for ways to acquire a single song at a reasonable price 
and without having to buy an entire album.194 Older, now-defunct 
services such as Napster195 and Grokster,196 as well as their successors, 
made it easy to accomplish this, and their users were able to obtain 
unauthorized copies of songs via downloads. The on-line nature of the 
activity also made it easy for the infringer to be tracked down by the 
copyright owner and face infringement liability. It is much easier to find 
unauthorized downloaders than it was to find individuals who copied 
music from a CD onto an mp3 player, or from the radio onto a cassette. 
Personal infringement has also taken on a new dimension with the 
advent of easily affordable three-dimensional printing.197 This new 
technology expands what was once only available for literary, pictorial, 
and graphical works—the ability to use computer technology to make a 
copy— to the realm of sculptural works. Now, one can download a 
never accorded the copyright owner complete control over all possible uses of his work. Rather, the 
Copyright Act grants the copyright holder “exclusive” rights to use and to authorize the use of his 
work in five qualified ways.”) (internal citations omitted). 
193. 17 U.S.C. § 106. 
194. See generally Alan Greenblatt, Future of the Music Industry, 13 CQ RESEARCHER 989 
(2003), available at http://library.cqpress.com/cqresearcher/cqresrre2003112100 (last visited Nov. 
19, 2016).  
195. A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d 1004 (9th Cir. 2001). 
196. MGM Studios, Inc. v. Grokster, Inc., 545 U.S. 913 (2005). There are still many websites
whereby one can make an unlawful download via a peer-to-peer network. 
197. See generally Lucas S. Osborn, Of PhDs, Pirates, and the Public: Three-Dimensional 
Printing Technology and the Arts, 1 TEXAS A&M L. REV. 811 (2014). 
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program and “print” a sculptural work in a way similar to downloading 
songs and movies. It will lead to new ways to express one’s creativity—
imagine drawing a picture of an animal, scanning it into a CAD file, and 
then making a sculptural work based on the drawing.198 Works may be 
created out of new forms of media.199 Should those who create and 
distribute digital “blueprints” for copyrighted sculptural works for use 
on three-dimensional copiers be held as contributory infringers, or even 
as direct infringers of the adaptation right? In this manner, the digital 
blueprint of the CAD file would be similar to the photograph that 
constitutes a two-dimensional representation of a three-dimensional 
work.200 While “a mere shift in medium, without more, is generally 
insufficient to satisfy the requirement of originality for copyright in a 
derivative work,”201 “[i]f the photographer’s rendition of a copyrighted 
work varies enough from the underlying work to enable the photograph 
to be distinguished from the underlying work (aside from the obvious 
shift from three dimensions to two), then the photograph contains 
sufficient incremental originality to qualify for copyright.”202
Even if it does not qualify as a derivative work, the CAD file may 
be infringing on the reproduction right as a substantially similar 
unauthorized reproduction of a copyrighted work.203 In addition, the use 
of the CAD file itself to recreate the copyrighted three-dimensional 
object would be an infringement of the copyright owner’s reproduction 
right.204
198. Lucas Osborn, Regulating Three-Dimensional Printing: The Converging Worlds of Bits
and Atoms, 51 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 553, 592 (2014) (The author asserts that the advancement of 3D 
printing “will bring the fields of art, science and technology into more intimate contact . . . [and] 
generate new forms of art. Further, the technology will allow the dissemination and preservation of 
3D art. Priceless artifacts can be replicated with exact precision so that thousands may touch and 
experience perfect copies.”). 
199. Id. 
200. Schrock v. Learning Curve, 586 F.3d 513 (7th Cir. 2009); Osborn, supra note 198, at 592 
(noting that “like the earlier song and movie pirating, the ability to create CAD files of 3D 
structures such as sculptures or buildings will likely lead to numerous, often innocent or 
unintentional, acts of infringement.”).  
201. Schrock, 586 F.3d at 520, n.3; see also L.A. News Serv. v. Tullo, 973 F.2d 791, 794 (9th
Cir. 1992) (“[C]ourts have recognized repeatedly that the creative decisions involved in producing a 
photograph may render it sufficiently original to be copyrightable and have carefully delineated 
selection of subject, posture, background, lighting, and perhaps even perspective alone as 
protectible [sic] elements of a photographer’s work.”) (internal quotations and citations omitted). 
202. Schrock, 586 F.3d at 521–22. 
203. See, e.g., N. Coast Indus. v. Jason Maxwell, Inc., 972 F.2d 1031, 1033 (9th Cir. 1992)
(“To establish copyright infringement, the holder of the copyright . . . must establish infringement 
by showing both access to its copyrighted material on the part of the alleged infringer and 
substantial similarity between the copyrighted work and the alleged infringing work.”). 
204. Id.
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B. Limiting Liability Bases to Avoid Unintended Consequences
We have seen who was an intended infringer in 1978, and how a
copyright owner’s rights were limited through what Congress considered 
the extent of rights based on the technology at the time.  There are 
several ways that this can be accomplished, two of which will be 
discussed. One method to define infringers and draw limits today is to 
use the presuppositions on copyright rights when the 1976 Act was 
enacted. Another is to account for new technologies in a way that 
maintains the balance of rights in a manner faithful to copyright’s basic 
purpose via a dynamic interpretation of the statute. 
Regarding the former—defining infringers and drawing limits using 
the presuppositions on copyright rights when the 1976 Act was 
enacted—Lawrence Lessig, in his seminal work, Fidelity in 
Translation,205 argues for an overall new approach to maintain fidelity to 
the constitution in the advent of new technology,206 through what he 
calls “a translation to accommodate a change in nonlegal 
presuppositions.”207 Lessig provides several illustrations of his 
“translation” approach. One involves the “Fourth Amendment 
protect[ion of] the right ‘of the people to be secure in their persons, 
houses, papers, and effects’ against unreasonable ‘searches and 
seizures.’”208 The amendment was limited to physical invasions of 
property, but at the time of its ratification in 1791, “given the crude state 
of surveillance technology, the only possible invasions were physical. 
Thus, in practice, the amendment protected against the vast majority of 
possible state invasions.”209
By 1928, when Olmstead v. United States210 was decided, 
the technology of possible state invasion had of course changed. New 
technology permitted the state to extract all the information it could 
ever want without ever crossing trespass law’s barrier . . . the practical 
effect of a protection that extended only against physical invasions was 
very little at all.211
Lessig uses Brandeis’ dissent in Olmstead to illustrate the concept that, 
regardless of technological advancements, we should protect against 
205. Lawrence Lessig, Fidelity in Translation, 71 TEX. L. REV. 1165, 1239-40 (1993) 
206. Id. at 1238. 
207. Id.
208. Id. (citing U.S. Const. amend. IV.).
209. Id.
210. 277 U.S. 438 (1928). 
211. Lessig, supra note 205, at 1238. 
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new risks of invasion not contemplated when the Fourth Amendment 
was ratified: 
[T]o preserve the same amount of protection originally afforded . . . the
protections of the Fourth Amendment must be applied to acts that fall
outside the literal scope of the test. If, counting eavesdropping, the
amendment protected citizens against ninety percent of the practical
means of governmental invasion when adopted, so too must it be ap-
plied to protection against ninety percent of those means today.212
Thus, with regard to Fourth Amendment privacy protections, Lessig 
argues that we should have the same security in our homes today that we 
did in 1791. 
Lessig’s concept of translation can be applied to our intended 
infringer issue, and how new technology is catching infringers in a net 
never meant for them. If we use Lessig’s theory of translation, we would 
take as our starting point the 1976 Copyright Act and determine what 
rights and limits copyright owners had on January 1, 1978.213 Copyright 
owners would have the same rights and protections that they had in 
1976, and no more. The copyright rights owners could exert would be 
limited to the extent it existed on that date and infringers would be those 
intended as infringers on that date. This would curb who was an 
intended infringer to those who were intended to be caught in 1978. 
Personal copying for media shifting was not infringement at that time, 
and would thus limit liability to personal copiers today. 
As noted previously, as second way to draw limits is to account for 
new technologies in a way that maintains the balance of rights in a 
manner faithful to copyright’s basic purpose, via a dynamic 
interpretation of the statute. As the Supreme Court stated in Aiken, 
“[w]hen technological change has rendered its literal terms ambiguous, 
the Copyright Act must be construed in light of this basic purpose.”214
This necessitates interpreting the statute in a manner that ensures 
copyright’s “balance of competing claims upon the public interest: 
Creative work is to be encouraged and rewarded, but private motivation 
must ultimately serve the cause of promoting broad public availability of 
literature, music, and the other arts.” 215 It is impossible to legislate fast 
enough to account for newer technologies in almost any area of law as 
soon as a law is enacted. At any moment there may be unintended 
212. Id. at 1240. 
213. The date of implementation of the Copyright Act of 1976.
214. Twentieth Century Music Corp. v. Aiken, 422 U.S. 151, 156 (1975). 
215. Id.
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consequences due to newer technology developed after the law became 
effective and before it can be amended to account for the advancement. 
To remediate the effect of this phenomenon to avoid unintended 
consequences—such as the capture of our unintended infringers—
effectuating the intent of the law means that courts may have to interpret 
statutes dynamically rather than statically.216 Understanding how newer 
technology maps to what was in place when a law was enacted may 
require courts to avoid a static interpretation of the statute, but rather 
apply the current technology and circumstances and construe the law 
dynamically so that its purpose is not eviscerated.   New technologies 
such as three-dimensional printing would also be accounted for in this 
paradigm, for both the infringing and noninfringing uses.217
Infringement actions against unauthorized reproduction for commercial 
use have been part of copyright law since the first Act of 1790.218 Thus, 
a finding of infringement is not an unintended consequence for this 
unauthorized use; one does not even need to look at the statute beyond 
its ordinary meaning when enacted or translate to the scope of rights that 
copyright owners held in 1978 to find that using three-dimensional 
printing to make a reproduction of a copyrighted work without 
authorization would be an infringement. 
Three-dimensional printing files used to create a copyrighted work 
may also fall within the requirements to be copyrightable under Section 
102.219 Using a translation model mapping to the time of the 1976 Act’s 
effective date220 would thus ensure that liability under the law would 
capture only those who were intended infringers, based on the rights of 
216. See generally William N. Eskridge, Jr., Dynamic Statutory Interpretation, 135 U. PA. L.
REV. 1479 (1987). 
217. The devices themselves have substantial non-infringing uses, and would therefore qualify 
under Sony and Grokster as immunizing the manufacturers from infringement liability. See Sony 
Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 442 (1984) (“[T]he sale of copying 
equipment, like the sale of other articles of commerce, does not constitute contributory infringement 
if the product is widely used for legitimate, unobjectionable purposes. Indeed, it need merely be 
capable of substantial noninfringing uses.”). 
218. Copyright Act of 1790, Sec. 1 (“[I]f any other person or persons . . . shall print, reprint,
publish, or import . . . without the consent of the author or proprietor thereof. . . then such 
offender . . . shall forfeit all and every sheet and sheets, being part of the same. . . to the author or 
proprietor of such map, chart, book or books, who shall forthwith destroy the same.”). 
219. See Osborn, supra note 197, at 825-35 (arguing and describing how CAD files which
satisfy the originality requirement and “represent nonessential, creative expression”—that is, are not 
categorized as “useful articles”—can be considered either a “literary work” or a “pictorial, graphic 
[or] sculptural work” and thus be copyrightable under Section 102(a) under the Copyright Act.). 
The method itself would not be copyrightable, as it runs afoul of Section 102(b) as a method of 
operation. See id.
220. January 1, 1978. 
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copyright owners at that time. 
IV. “ONE SIZE FITS ALL” MISFITTED STATUTORY DAMAGES
We must also examine whether new classes of infringers should
face the same monetary remedies that were originally intended for 
commercial bootleggers and pirates. This leads to our next discussion: 
whether the Due Process clause precludes these large punitive damages 
awards, and whether it is up to Congress to modify the statutory 
damages section of the Copyright Act away from a single, monolithic 
remedy and instead create a tiered remedy similar to both previous 
iterations of the Copyright Act221 as well as how other nations have 
chosen to address different types of intended infringers. 
During the latter part of the twentieth and the early twenty-first 
centuries, the recording industry energetically pursued individuals who 
downloaded songs from unauthorized sites,222 and courts routinely found 
the defendants liable for infringement, who then faced astronomical 
damages. Despite challenges to the validity of multimillion-dollar 
damages for unauthorized file sharing, federal courts continue to find 
such remedies constitutional.223
A. The Current System of Undifferentiated Damages
Currently, there is no differentiation regarding damages between
large scale, small scale, or personal infringement. Courts have repeatedly 
upheld as constitutional outrageous damages for peer-to-peer 
downloads.224 “The Supreme Court long ago declared that damages 
awarded pursuant to a statute violate due process only if they are so 
severe and oppressive as to be wholly disproportioned to the offense and 
obviously unreasonable. Under this standard, Congress possesses a wide 
latitude of discretion in setting statutory damages.”225 Thus, for minimal 
221. See supra notes 60-61 and accompanying text.
222. See, e.g., London-Sire v. Doe 1, 542 F. Supp. 2d 153 (D Mass. 2008); Capitol Records, 
Inc. v. Thomas, 579 F. Supp. 2d 1210 (D Minn. 2008). 
223. See Jeffrey Stavroff, Damages in Dissonance: the ‘Shocking’ Penalty for Illegal Music
File-Sharing, 39 CAP. U. L. REV. 659 (2011). 
224. See, e.g., Sony BMGH Music Entm’t v. Tenenbaum, 719 F.3d 67, 68 (1st Cir 2013)
(upholding an award of $675,000—$22,500 for each of the thirty songs the defendant infringed on 
though an unauthorized peer-to-peer download—against Due Process arguments); Capitol Records, 
Inc. v. Thomas-Rasset, 692 F.3d 899, 907 (8th Cir. 2012) (holding that “statutory damages award of 
$9,250 for each of the twenty-four infringed songs, for a total of $222,000, does not contravene the 
Due Process Clause.”). 
225. Thomas-Rasset, 692 F.3d at 907, citing St. Louis, I. M. & S. Ry. Co. v. Williams, 251 
U.S. 63, 67 (1919) (internal quotations omitted). Courts have ignored the Due Process test of BMW 
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actual damages, copyright owners are able to exact exponentially greater 
financial awards.226
In their article arguing for reforming statutory damages, Professors 
Samuelson and Wheatland observed that “[i]n the modern world in 
which the average person in her day-to-day life interacts with many 
copyrighted works in a way that may implicate copyright law, the 
dangers posed by a lack of meaningful constraints on statutory damage 
awards are acute.”227 Professors Samuelson and Wheatland note that 
historically, the intent behind statutory damages was compensatory in 
nature,228 yet oftentimes the awards are inconsistent with this intent.229
The exploitation of this remedy today has made it a de facto punitive 
remedy, whereby the copyright owners claim hundreds of thousands of 
dollars in damages for significantly lower economic losses, oftentimes 
claiming the deterrent effect of their approach. Because courts have 
refused to consider these awards as putative damages, however, it is now 
up to Congress to address any perceived fundamental unfairness.230
With regard to piracy and bootlegging, there is a valid argument 
that when the purpose of the infringement is for commercial gain, then 
the size of the operation is irrelevant—large and small-scale bootleggers 
and pirates who copy for commercial gain should be treated the same 
with regard to remedies. If the goal is to discourage this form of 
infringement—which causes commercial harm to the copyright 
owner231—then there is no rationale for distinguishing based on the size 
of the infringement. Indeed, since statutory damages are based on the 
of North America v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 562-63 (1996), used for punitive damages. For a further 
discussion arguing for the use of the Gore standard for determining statutory damages in Copyright 
Law, see generally Pamela Samuelson & Tara Wheatland, Statutory Damages in Copyright Law: A 
Remedy in Need of Reform, 51 WM. & MARY L. REV. 439, 464-473 (2009).   
226. Stavroff, supra note 223, at 661 (noting that courts have repeatedly upheld large
monetary damages for unauthorized file sharing against arguments that such awards “are excessive 
and . . . violate of notions of fairness and due process of law.”). 
227. Samuelson & Wheatland, supra note 225, at 443. For an in-depth discussion on the
problems of statutory damages, see generally id.
228. Id. at 446 (“Statutory damages in U.S. copyright law have historically been intended to
ensure that copyright owners could obtain at least some measure of compensation when it was 
difficult to prove how much damage they had suffered as a result of the defendants’ infringement.” 
(citing to the legislative history and stenographic reports of the 1909 Act)). 
229. Id. at 480-91. 
230. Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 208 (2003) (“[W]e are not at liberty to second-guess 
congressional determinations and policy judgments [regarding extending the copyright term under 
the Copyright Term Extension Act], however debatable or arguably unwise they may be.”). See 
discussion infra for how Congress could address the issue. 
231. See, e.g., Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enterprises, 471 U.S. 539, 568 (1985)
(holding: “a use that supplants any part of the normal market for a copyrighted work would 
ordinarily be considered an infringement”). 
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“work” and not the “copy,” the same liability is incurred whether one 
makes 2, 20, 200 or 20,000 unauthorized copies.232 In these instances, a 
plaintiff would likely be better off seeking the greater award of actual 
damages. 
Even when the infringement results in minimal actual damages, if 
the resulting infringement is for commercial gain, we must still question 
whether the plaintiff should be able to seek more than recovery of 
economic loss. Retention of the current provision for statutory damages 
morphs the compensatory nature of statutory damages into punitive 
damages. For example, in Zomba Enterprises v. Panorama Records,233
Panorama was in the business of selling CDs for use in karaoke 
machines,234 and was found liable for copyright infringement through its 
copying and distributing unauthorized songs.235 The Eighth Circuit 
upheld the district court’s award of $806,000 in statutory damages 
($31,000 each for twenty-six counts of willful infringement), as well as 
$76,456.26 and $1,058.91 in attorney fees and costs, respectively.236
While the commercial nature of Panorama Records’ infringement is 
outside any of the traditional noncommercial exemptions Congress has 
historically afforded that are discussed supra,237 we must question 
whether this is a rational reason for awarding such disproportionate 
damages to the copyright owner.238
B. Tiered Damages and Class Actions
Beyond the issue of disproportionate statutory damages, if we
choose to retain a newly discovered infringer as a legitimate target for 
liability, we should consider adjusting our statutory damages regime to 
account for the contemporary noncommercial infringers who are now 
caught in the infringement net.239 As discussed supra, our own history of 
232. 17 U.S.C. § 504(c)(1) (“[T]he copyright owner may elect . . . to recover, instead of actual 
damages and profits, an award of statutory damages for all infringements involved in the action, 
with respect to any one work, for which any one infringer is liable individually, or for which any 
two or more infringers are liable jointly and severally, in a sum of not less than $750 or more than 
$30,000 as the court considers just.”) (emphasis added). 
233. 491 F.3d 574 (6th Cir. 2006). 
234. Id. at 578. 
235. Id. at 580. 
236. Id. The Eighth Circuit rejected Panorama’s arguments that (1) their copying fell within
copyright’s Fair Use defense and that (2) the damages award violated the Eighth Amendment’s 
prohibition against excessive fines and violated their due process rights. 
237. See supra Part II.A.
238. See generally Samuelson & Wheatland, supra note 225. 
239. See supra Part III.A.2.
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infringement remedies recognizes that noncommercial copying deserves 
some protection from monetary damages.240 For non-media shifting, 
noncommercial copying (e.g. unauthorized infringing file sharing) the 
history and intent of copyright damages support limiting statutory 
damages or eliminating them completely. 
Other nations have recognized the absurdity of large monetary 
awards for small actual economic damages. Under the Canadian 
Copyright Act,241 for example, statutory damages for individuals whose 
infringement was for non-commercial purposes is limited to $5,000 
Canadian Dollars ($CAD),242 an amount “that the court considers 
just.”243 Even commercial infringement has a maximum damages award 
of 20,000 $CAD.244 Incorporating a similar regime into our own 
copyright act would return us to the intent behind statutory damages—to 
account for economic loss that is difficult to determine.245
As with most litigation, unless the potential damages award is 
sufficiently high, there is a disincentive for suing individuals. However, 
as noted in a previous article,246 while individually suing every 
consumer who made an unauthorized download of a song would be 
240. See supra Part II.C.
241. Copyright Act (R.S.C., 1985, c. C-42).
242. $1 CAD = $0.75 USD, as of March 2017, GOOGLE FINANCE,
https://www.google.com/finance?q=CADUSD&ei=2Im8WPC5JsXO2Aa66rrQCg (last visited Mar. 
5, 2017). 
243. Copyright Act § 38.1(1)(b): 
Subject to this section, a copyright owner may elect, at any time before final judgment is 
rendered, to recover, instead of damages and profits referred to in subsection 35(1), an
award of statutory damages for which any one infringer is liable individually, or for
which any two or more infringers are liable jointly and severally, in a sum of not less
than $100 and not more than $5,000 that the court considers just, with respect to all in-
fringements involved in the proceedings for all works or other subject-matter, if the in-
fringements are for noncommercial purposes. 
244. § 38.1(1)(a): 
Subject to this section, a copyright owner may elect, at any time before final judgment is
rendered, to recover, instead of damages and profits referred to in subsection 35(1), an
award of statutory damages for which any one infringer is liable individually, or for
which any two or more infringers are liable jointly and severally, (a) in a sum of not less
than $500 and not more than $20,000 that the court considers just, with respect to all in-
fringements involved in the proceedings for each work or other subject-matter, if the in-
fringements are for commercial purposes.
245. See Samuelson and Wheatland, supra note 225, at 446. 
246. Yvette Joy Liebesman, Downstream Copyright Infringers, 60 U. KAN. L. REV. 1, 15-17 
(2011) (discussing the plausibility of having a defendant class for a copyright infringement claim 
against a group of individual infringers who downloaded an infringing song); see also Francis X. 
Shen, The Overlooked Utility of the Defendant Class Action, 88 Denv. U. L. REV. 73, 105-106 
(2010) (discussing unauthorized online file sharing as a potential application for the use of the 
defendant class). 
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burdensome, a plaintiff copyright owner could seek certification of a 
defendant class for those identified as making unauthorized copies via 
download.247
V. FINAL THOUGHTS
Congress was cognizant that the changes enacted in the 1976 Act 
would capture entities that were not intended to be infringers. They did 
this when enacting several sections of the Copyright Act that exempted 
certain noncommercial uses.248 For example, when including Section 
110(5)249—the Homestyle Exemption—Congress realized that because 
of new technologies, without an exemption, small businesses would be 
held liable for the simple act of playing a radio on their premises. While 
Congress was loathe to adopt the rationale of the Supreme Court in 
Twentieth Century v. Aiken,250 the legislature still wanted this 
noncommercial personal use to be exempted from copyright liability. 
These individuals were not intended infringers, and Congress statutorily 
protected them. New technologies have resulted in liability that could 
not be contemplated when the 1976 Act was written—and had never 
been contemplated throughout the history of copyright—but now 
endangers what had been previously and consistently held to be a non-
infringing personal use.251  How we protect these unintended infringers 
is of paramount importance to maintain faith in our copyright system. 
247. A “class action” suit is one: 
in which the court authorizes a single person or a small group of people to represent the
interests of a larger group; [specifically, it is] a lawsuit in which the convenience either
of the public or of the interested parties requires that the case be settled through litigation 
by or against only a part of the group of similarly situated persons and in which a person 
whose interests are or may be affected does not have an opportunity to protect his or her
interests by appearing personally or through a personally selected representative, or
through a person specially appointed to act as a trustee or guardian. 
Black’s Law Dictionary 284 (9th ed. 2009). 
248. See generally Litman, supra note 156, at 1895-98 (outlining many of exemptions to
copyright infringement based on noncommercial personal use embodied in the Copyright Act). 
249. 17 U.S.C. § 110(5)(A): 
[E]xcept as provided in subparagraph (B), communication of a transmission embodying
a performance or display of a work by the public reception of the transmission on a sin-
gle receiving apparatus of a kind commonly used in private homes, unless (i) a direct
charge is made to see or hear the transmission; or (ii) the transmission thus received is
further transmitted to the public. 
250. 422 U.S. 151 (1975) (holding that, by merely playing the radio, Aiken was not publicly
performing the works in question). 
251. See Litman, supra note 156, at 1882 (noting that “[f]or most of the history of copyright,
the law left reading, listening and viewing unconstrained . . . [and] functioned as historical copyright 
liberties, implicit in the copyright statutory scheme and essential to its purpose.”). 
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By redefining the intended infringer, historically non-infringing 
uses that are now caught in the infringement net may be set free and 
realign our copyright regime to its historical boundaries and intentions. 
For example, fanfiction—a historically non-infringing use—is now 
facing infringement liability. Fanfiction is almost as old as the written 
word. Virgil’s Aeneid252 was fan fiction of the Iliad, and John Milton’s 
fanfiction of the Bible in Paradise Lost253 are two of its oldest 
examples.254 Sir Arthur Conan Doyle’s fans created countless stories 
involving Sherlock Holmes and Dr. Watson and “effectively invented 
modern fandom.”255 A fan—that is, an enthusiast for an amusement or 
artist—takes many forms, some of which result in the fan creating her 
own creative expression. Sports teams regularly have fans dressing as 
“characters” that illustrate their love for their team. Ram Man was a 
fixture in Saint Louis (Figure 2). 
Figure 2: Ram Man256
252. VIRGIL, AENEID (19-32 BCE). In the Aeneid, Virgil writes about the adventures of
Aeneas, who was a character in Homer’s Iliad.  
253. JOHN MILTON, PARADISE LOST (1667). Milton’s epic poem retells the stories of Satan,
Adam and Eve, and the latter two’s fall from grace and banishment from the Garden of Eden. 
254. Stacey M. Lantagne, Sherlock Holmes and the Case of the Lucrative Fandom: 
Recognizing the Economic Power of Fanworks and Reimagining Fair Use in Copyright, 21 MICH.
TELECOMM. & TECH L. REV. 263, 267 (2015). 
255. Id. at 270. 
256. Blake Fehl, Vote for The Flick Fanatic/Ram Man in STL Today’s Rams Fanatic Blog
Contest, REVIEWSTL.COM (Sept. 2, 2009), http://www.reviewstl.com/vote-for-the-flick-fanaticram-
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We now have various fandom conventions, meet-ups, cosplay, and 
the creation of fanart and fanfiction.257 “Fanworks can be essays, stories, 
art, videos, songs, or any other form of art. With limited exceptions, they 
circulate outside the money economy, shared freely with other fans.”258
Throughout its long history, the vast majority of fan fiction stays 
unpublished and solely in the hands of the author. Notebooks where we 
write our stories never see the light of day, created for the creator’s own 
amusement or to be shared only with a close circle of friends, which is 
shared in similar manners today. 
[H]undreds of years ago, many women wrote extensively but typically
only for private circulation amongst friends and acquaintances[.]
[F]anfiction is part of an informal, communal cultural exchange, func-
tioning not as a capitalistic enterprise but as a kind of gift economy:
I’ll write you this story, a fanfic writer might say, e-mailing her friend
snippets of prose; you write me something back.259
Fan fiction, like any creative endeavor, is an integral part of the 
human condition. “Creativity is often experienced as an autonomic 
function, like making antibodies. People create as a function of their 
humanity; people who can’t think of themselves as creators are 
damaged.”260 Children dress in capes and act as their favorite 
superheroes in ways that were never anticipated by the original authors. 
They create stories, draw pictures, and make sculptures of their idols. 
When I was in elementary school, my childhood friend Sally was a huge 
fan of the mid-1970s TV show “Planet of the Apes.” Together, we 
created our own fan fiction—in the form of an “audio drama” where we 
voiced all of the characters. We had a (very bad) script and would spend 
our days recording and then listening to our “episodes.”261 Were we 
infringing? Under the 1909 Act, these would be considered unpublished 
works, and therefore not within the purview of federal copyright law.262
man-in-stltodays-rams-fanatic-blog-contest/. While Ram Man is unlikely to be infringing on any 
copyrights (costumes generally are not copyrightable), there are aspects of the costume that could be 
copyrightable, and it is a cool example of fandom. 
257. Lantagne, supra note 254, at 275-76
258. Rebecca Tushnet, Economies of Desire: Fair Use and Marketplace Assumptions, 51 WM.
& MARY L. REV. 513, 527 (2009). 
259. Lantagne, supra note 254, at 315 (quoting Morgan L. Davies, A Brief History of Slash, 
THE TOAST (Sept. 19, 2013), http://the-toast.net/2013/09/19/brief-history-slash/). 
260. Tushnet, supra note 258, at 526. 
261. From what I recall, we immediately “killed off” all of the characters we hated.
262. 1909 Act, Sec. 10 (“Any person entitled thereto by this title may secure copyright for his
work by publication thereof with notice of copyright required by this title; and such notice shall be 
affixed to each copy thereof published or offered for sale in the United States by authority of the 
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We were not intended infringers,263 and should continue having that 
status under the current law. It seems absurd that something so central a 
part of humanity and human creativity could be labeled an unlawful 
appropriation. 
If, instead, we made our audio drama under the regime of the 1976 
Act, would our creative expression fall under fair use? If this defense 
failed, it mattered little—we were not intended infringers. We did not 
seek economic recompense for our efforts, and since no one knew about 
our creative venture, there was no way for 20th Century Fox 
Television264 to be aware of our work. Should it matter if we unwisely 
uploaded our performance onto the internet? Professor Stacey Lantagne 
identified the value of non-publication that fanfiction authors 
understood: 
Fandom seems to recognize that it is not really the lack of monetiza-
tion of their works that protects them, but their ability to fly under the 
radar and beneath the copyright-holder’s notice so as to not provoke 
the copyright-holder’s sense of moral outrage and violation. Monetiza-
tion of a fanwork raises the profile of the work and attracts too much 
attention in the copyright regime, making monetization unattractive for 
creators of fanworks, even though such development may even benefit 
copyright holders.265
Creating one’s own “fan fiction” in a spiral notebook or on our cassette 
tape would be undetectable to the copyright owner. Yet, as recognized 
by fandom, posting those same works to a blog could open one up to 
liability, and it is unclear under what circumstances the Fair Use defense 
would offer a shield from a finding of infringement.266 In essence, 
copyright law is being used to take an art form that historically has been 
a freely available public good and privatizing it. 
When evaluating the fair use defense as applied to fanfiction 
infringement litigation, judges are often influenced by (1) the 
commercial or noncommercial nature of the first factor, and (2) their 
own subjective judgment regarding the “transformativeness” of the new 
copyright proprietor.”). 
263. State common law copyright infringement might still be available, but again, it would be
incredibly difficult for the copyright owner to become cognizant of our work, and again, our actions 
should not be considered the intended target under common law, either. 
 264.  Planet of the Apes, IMDB, http://www.imdb.com/title/tt0071033/
companycredits?ref_=tt_ql_dt_5 (last visited May 1, 2017) 
265. Lantagne, supra note 254, at 289. 
266. Id. at 283 (The author notes that “while fanworks occupy an important space in the
creative culture, their legal status is unsettled. The systemic lack of support in the precedents for 
fanworks as a form of accepted expression should be of concern.”). 
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work, inadvertently acting as art and literary critics.267 Disparate 
holdings in the limited fan fiction litigation on record illustrates a focus 
on fair use’s subjective first factor of transformativeness, leading “to an 
unpredictability that breeds inefficiency. Indeed, this unpredictability 
may actually deter creation, contrary to the intended effect of copyright 
law, as creators will be unable to predict whether their creations will be 
subsequently stifled.”268 By redefining the intended infringer to exclude 
these traditional outlets of creativity, we can loosen the net that has 
captured artists and authors who historically were not intended to be 
liable for infringement. 
An effective copyright system requires the ability of authors and 
other rights holders to commercially exploit and capture the traditional 
intended infringers. Without limitations, however, these rights could 
result in rent-seeking and interfere with the rights of readers, listeners, 
and viewers to enjoy those works.269 Ensuring that a copyright owner’s 
rights are limited as they were intended to be limited, and that the law 
captures only those who were intended to be captured in the 
infringement net, is key to maintaining copyright’s precarious 
balance.270
267. Id. at 291. This aesthetic determination contradicts the long held nondiscrimination
doctrine—that courts will not act as art critics. Bleistein v. Donaldson Lithographing Co, 188 U.S. 
239 (1903) (“It would be a dangerous undertaking for persons trained only to the law to constitute 
themselves final judges of the worth of pictorial illustrations.”); see also Lantagne, supra note 254, 
at 295 (arguing that, when courts focus on transformativeness under the first fair use factor, they are 
making inappropriate aesthetic value judgments of the allegedly infringing work). 
268. Id. at 294. 
269. See Litman, supra note 156, at 1918. 
270. See Twentieth Century Music Corp. v. Aiken, 422 U.S. 151, 156 (1975).
The limited scope of the copyright holder’s statutory monopoly, like the limited copy-
right duration required by the Constitution, reflects a balance of competing claims upon
the public interest: Creative work is to be encouraged and rewarded, but private motiva-
tion must ultimately serve the cause of promoting broad public availability of literature,
music, and the other arts. 
The immediate effect of our copyright law is to secure a fair return for an ‘author’s’ 
creative labor. But the ultimate aim is, by this incentive, to stimulate artistic creativity 
for the general public good. ‘The sole interest of the United States and the primary object 
in conferring the monopoly,’ this Court has said, ‘lie in the general benefits derived by
the public from the labors of authors.’ 
Id.
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